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INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION IN TEXAS:




EXAS rapidly is becoming a center for international trade as in-
dustry shifts to the sunbelt states, trade with Mexico increases, the
commercial centers of Houston and Dallas grow increasingly im-
portant, and agricultural exports remain vital to the nation's balance of
payments.' As international trade becomes more important to the state's
economy, litigation involving our foreign commerce is certain to increase
proportionately. Unfortunately, the Texas procedures for dealing with in-
ternational litigation, which may differ significantly from those used in
strictly domestic litigation, have not kept pace with commercial develop-
ment. This Article considers those aspects of international litigation relat-
ing to the service of process abroad. Both Texas and federal rules and
statutes for service of process in other countries are compared with the
methods sanctioned by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of
Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters.2
The general requirements for obtaining in personam and in rem jurisdic-
tion and the problems posed by the different methods of service also are
discussed. Finally, alternatives for serving foreign persons and companies
are considered.
I. OBTAINING IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION
Personal jurisdiction in American courts entered the modern era a few
months after the end of World War II in 1945, with the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.3
Throwing off the shackles imposed by Pennoyer v. Neff, 4 the Supreme
* B.A., Southern Methodist University; J.D., The University of Texas. Attorney at
Law, Hughes & Hill, Dallas, Texas. The author wishes to thank Patricia Daly for her inval-
uable editorial assistance.
1. Carl, Recognition of Texas Judgments in Courts of Foreign Nations--and Vice Versa,
13 Hous. L. REV. 680 (1976).
2. November 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163, reprintedin
8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 4617 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Convention].
3. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
4. 95 U.S. 714 (1878). In Pennoyer the Supreme Court held that a party's presence
within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to the rendition of a judgment
personally binding upon him. Id at 733.
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Court held that "due process requires only that in order to subject a de-
fendant to a judgment inpersonam, if he be not present within the territory
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.' " The Court found that the defendant's contacts
with the forum state were systematic and continuous and that service by
registered mail to its home office and by delivery to its agent within the
forum state was proper.6 "Minimum contacts" still remains the basic due
process test for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents.
In 1957 in personam jurisdiction reached its high water mark with the
Supreme Court's decision in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.7
The defendant in that case had only one contact with the forum state, an
insurance contract entered into by mail. In holding such limited contact
sufficient to invoke jurisdiction, the Court noted the evolutionary expan-
sion of state court jurisdiction as technological changes in transportation
and communications had made the defense of a suit less burdensome.8
The Court also observed that California had enacted special legislation
declaring its manifest interest in providing redress for citizens injured by
insurance companies. 9
One year later, the Court cautioned that state boundaries had not be-
come irrelevant for personal jurisdiction.' 0 In Hanson v. Denckla the
Court articulated what has become the primary limitation on the mini-
mum contacts test of International Shoe:
[T]he unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with
the forum State. . . . [I]t is essential in each case that there be some
act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws. "
The Court reiterated the restriction of Hanson v. Denckla in 1980 in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 2 There the Supreme Court
overturned an Oklahoma court's ruling that nonresident defendants with
activities limited to certain northeastern states could be forced to defend a
products liability suit in Oklahoma on a showing that it was foreseeable
that the automobiles they sold could be used in Oklahoma.13 The Court
stated that "the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis . . . is
that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such
5. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
6. 326 U.S. at 320.
7. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
8. Id at 222-23.
9. Id at 221, 223.
10. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
11. Id at 253.
12. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
13. Id at 290-91.
1014 [Vol. 35
INTERNA TIONAL LITIGATION
that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there."14 The
Court added that the due process clause ensures a degree of predictability
as to where defendants may or may not be sued.15
Federal courts sitting in Texas have developed their own shorthand for-
mulations of the limitations imposed by the due process clause. Before a
federal court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, the law
of the state must confer jurisdiction, and the exercise of jurisdiction under
state law must comport with due process requirements.' 6 In Product Pro-
motions, Inc. v. Cousteau 17 the Fifth Circuit restated the International Shoe
holding as a two-part test: (1) the defendant must have minimum contacts
with the forum state, and (2) it must be fair and reasonable to require the
defendant to defend in the forum.' 8 This has become the principal test
cited by federal courts sitting in Texas for determining the validity of an
exercise of personal jurisdiction.' 9 A federal district court has enumerated
five factors to be considered when determining the constitutionality of tak-
ing personal jurisdiction: (1) the nature of the business, (2) the quantity
and character of activities in the forum, (3) whether the activities in the
forum gave rise to the cause of action, (4) whether the forum has a special
interest in granting relief, and (5) the relative convenience to the parties.20
The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant may have one of
several bases. A general appearance obviously will subject a defendant to
the court's jurisdiction,2' as will consent. 22 Domicile,23 residence, 24 and
citizenship 25 are other jurisdiction-creating connections. These are usually
considered "generally affiliating" contacts; they are so substantial that they
14. Id. at 297.
15. Id
16. See Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191, 196 (5th Cir. 1980); Walker v. Newgent,
583 F.2d 163, 166 (5th Cir. 1978), cerl. denied, 441 U.S. 906 (1979); Product Promotions, Inc.
v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 489 (5th Cir. 1974); Navarro v. Sedco, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 1355,
1357 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Murdock v. Volvo of Am. Corp., 403 F. Supp. 55, 56-57 (N.D. Tex.
1975).
17. 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974).
18. Id at 494.
19. See, e.g., Jamesbury Corp. v. Kitamura Valve Mfg. Co., 484 F. Supp. 533, 536 (S.D.
Tex. 1980); Western Desert, Inc. v. Chase Resources Corp., 460 F. Supp. 63, 64 (N.D. Tex.
1978); Navarro v. Sedco, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 1355, 1360-61 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Reich v. Signal
Oil & Gas Co., 409 F. Supp. 846, 849 (S.D. Tex. 1974), ajf'dmerr, 530 F.2d 974 (5th Cir.
1976).
20. Lone Star Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 185 F. Supp. 48, 56 (S.D. Tex.
1960), rev'd on other grounds, 288 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1961); Hearne v. Dow-Badische Chem.
Co., 224 F. Supp. 90, 99 (S.D. Tex. 1963); Pliler v. Asiatic Petroleum Co., 197 F. Supp. 212,
216 (S.D. Tex. 1961).
21. Sugg v. Thornton, 132 U.S. 524, 530 (1889); Banco Minero v. Ross, 106 Tex. 522,
526, 172 S.W. 711, 714 (1915); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 33 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
22. National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND), supra note 21, § 32.
23. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note
21, § 29.
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 21, § 30.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437-38
(1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 21, § 31.
101519821
1016 SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35
will support a finding of jurisdiction whether or not the cause of action is
related to the defendant's contacts with the forum state.26 By contrast, a
"specifically affiliating" contact is one that will permit jurisdiction only
over causes of action related to the defendant's contacts with the forum.27
The dictum in Shaffer v. Heitner28 that "all assertions of state-court juris-
diction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in Interna-
tional Shoe" makes it doubtful whether a person subjects himself to the
jurisdiction of a state's courts for all purposes merely by passing through
the state. 29 If a defendant's trip to another state is related to the plaintiff's
cause of action against him, however, service accomplished while he is in
the state may be sufficient. Thus, presence, traditionally considered a gen-
erally affiliating ground for jurisdiction,30 may now be only a specifically
affiliating circumstance.
Other grounds for in personam jurisdiction include the specifically affili-
ating tests of doing business, committing acts, and causing consequences in
the forum. 3' While the relevant Texas statute32 defines doing business so
broadly as to encompass committing acts and causing consequences as
well, 33 this is not the standard definition of the phrase.34 Doing business
may be a generally affiliating basis of jurisdiction if the defendant's busi-
ness interests in the forum are sufficiently substantial and continuous, 35 or
continuous and systematic 3 6 Causing consequences in the forum (e.g., by
26. Weintraub, Jurisdiction Over the Person and Service of Process, in I STATE BAR OF
TEXAS, ADVANCED CIVIL TRIAL COURSE H-7 (1980).
27. Id at H-8.
28. 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
29. Weintraub, supra note 26, at H-8.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 21, § 28.
31. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 103, 109 (1971).
32. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 203 1b, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1980-198 1). Section 4
defines "doing business" as follows:
For the purpose of this Act, and without including other acts that may con-
stitute doing business, any foreign corporation, joint stock company, associa-
tion, partnership, or non-resident natural person shall be deemed doing
business in this State by entering into contract by mail or otherwise with a
resident of Texas to be performed in whole or in part by either party in this
State, or the committing of any tort in whole or in part in this State. The act
of recruiting Texas residents, directly or through an intermediary located in
Texas, for employment inside or outside of Texas shall be deemed doing busi-
ness in this State.
Id
33. Weintraub, supra note 26, at H-10.
34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 21, § 35, Comment a. Section 35 provides
that doing business is "doing a series of similar acts for the purpose of thereby realizing
pecuniary benefit, or otherwise accomplishing an object, or doing a single act for such pur-
pose with the intention of thereby initiating a series of such acts." Id
35. Jamesbury Corp. v. Kitamura Valve Mfg. Co., 484 F. Supp. 533, 537 (S.D. Tex.
1980); Navarro v. Sedco, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 1355, 1362 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
36. Docutel Corp. v. S.A. Matra, 464 F. Supp. 1209, 1220 (N.D. Tex. 1979). These tests
are based on the Supreme Court's holding in Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342
U.S. 437, 445 (1952) (continuous and systematic activities such as holding of directors' meet-
ings, banking, corporate correspondence, payment of salaries, and purchase of equipment
sufficient to make subjection of corporation to in personam jurisdiction "fair and reason-
able"). In Perkins the corporation owned mines located in the Philippine Islands, but con-
ducted business temporarily in Ohio because of the Japanese occupation of those islands
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION
placing into the stream of commerce products that cause harm, when the
defendant knows or should know that they will be sold or resold in the
forum state) should support jurisdiction when the plaintiff's cause of action
is connected with the product. 37 The same is true of a defendant's breach
of contract when the contract required performance in the forum state.38
In both situations it is foreseeable that the defendant's actions may cause
harm in the forum; furthermore, because the defendant has sought to serve
the forum's market in some way, it is also foreseeable that he might be
brought to justice there.39
In construing due process limitations in conjunction with an Illinois
long-arm statute similar to that of Texas, the Texas Supreme Court
adopted the following formulation of requirements for personal
jurisdiction:
(1) The nonresident defendant or foreign corporation must purpose-
fully do some act or consummate some transaction in the forum state;
(2) the cause of action must arise from, or be connected with, such act
or transaction; and (3) the assumption of jurisdiction by the forum
state must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice, consideration being given to the quality, nature, and extent of
the activity in the forum state, the relative convenience of the parties,
the benefits and protection of the laws of the forum state afforded the
respective parties, and the basic equities of the situation. °
In later cases, Texas courts have used this test in construing the Texas
long-arm statute.4 ' State and constitutional rules for in personam jurisdic-
tion have been held to apply to service under the Hague Convention as
well. 42
II. THE HAGUE CONVENTION
The Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extraju-
dicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters was completed in 1965.
Twenty nations are presently parties to the treaty.4 3 Application of the
during World War II. Because of its unusual facts, the holding in that case that "doing
business" is a generally affiliating basis ofjurisdiction may be questionable. R. WMINRAuB,
supra note 31, at 108.
37. See Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191, 200 (5th Cir. 1980).
38. See, e.g., Docutel Corp. v. S.A. Matra, 464 F. Supp. 1209, 1215 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
39. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
40. O'Brien v. Lanpar Co., 399 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. 1966) (quoting Tyee Constr. Co.
v. Dulien Steel Prods., Inc., 62 Wash. 2d 106, 381 P.2d 245, 251 (1963)).
41. See, e.g., U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978); Wright Waterproofing Co. v. Applied Polymers, 602 S.W.2d
67, 71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas), writ refd iLr.e. per curiam, 608 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1980);
Sherman Gin Co. v. Planters Gin Co., 599 S.W.2d 348, 350 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
42. Martin Motor Sales, Inc. v. Saab-Scania of Am., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 389, 390
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
43. The countries that currently are parties to the Convention are Barbados, Belgium,
Botswana, Denmark, Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Israel, Japan,
Luxembourg, Malawi, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Seychelles, Sweden, Turkey, the
19821 1017
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Hague Convention is limited by its terms to civil and commercial cases.44
This clearly excludes criminal matters, and probably also eliminates tax
and administrative cases.45 The Convention requires each contracting
party to designate a central authority to receive and process requests for
service within its territory from other contracting nations.46 The central
authority receiving the request serves the document itself or arranges to
have it served by an appropriate agency.47 The use of a central authority
is not mandatory, but its services are always available. 48
Article 5 lists the principal methods of service sanctioned by the Con-
vention. These procedures are available only when the documents are
transmitted through the central authority. The central authority may serve
the document by any method allowed by its domestic law49 or by any par-
ticular method requested by the applicant, unless such an alternative
method is incompatible with local law. 50 Normally the central authority
will be requested to make personal service upon the defendant, which is
unlikely to be incompatible with its own law .5 Mere inconvenience is not
a ground for refusing to make service in the manner requested.52 No
charge is made for the services of the central authority,53 but the applicant
usually will be required to pay the costs of the process server.54 The cen-
tral authority can require that the documents to be served be written in, or
be translated into, the official language of its country, 55 but the standard
terms on the model form always must be written in either French or Eng-
lish and also may be written in the language of the originating country. 56
The blanks on the form next to the standard terms may be completed ei-
ther in French, English, or the language of the nation addressed. 57
Another method of service expressly permitted by article 5 is remise sim-
ple, the delivery of a document to a person who accepts it voluntarily.
This procedure can be used only when it is not incompatible with the law
of the nation where service is made;58 it is used frequently in Western Eu-
rope.59 Generally, the central authority merely transmits the documents to
United Kingdom, and the United States. 8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIREcTORY 4619
(1982).
44. Convention, supra note 2, art. 1.
45. Horlick, A Practical Guide to Service of United States Process Abroad, 14 INT'L LAW.
637, 646-47 (1980).
46. Convention, supra note 2, art. 2.
47. Id art. 5.
48. Amram, The Proposed International Convention on the Service of Documents Abroad,
51 A.B.A.J. 650, 653 (1965).
49. Id art. 5(a).
50. Id art. 5(b).
51. Horlick, supra note 45, at 648-49.
52. Id at 649.
53. Convention, supra note 2, art. 12; see Amram, supra note 48, at 653.
54. See Amram, supra note 48, at 653; Horlock, supra note 45, at 648.
55. Convention, supra note 2, art. 5.
56. Id art. 7; see id Annex to the Convention (model form titled Request/or Service
Abroad of Judicial or Extrajudicial Documents).
57. Id art. 7; see Amram, supra note 48, at 653.
58. Convention, supra note 2, art. 5.
59. Horlick, supra note 45, at 649.
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a local police station, which calls the person to be served and asks him to
pick them up.60 The defendant usually obliges. 6'
Other methods of service are permitted by the Convention, but only if
the nation in which the process is to be served does not object. Service
may be made directly through diplomatic or consular officials on nationals
of either the nation of destination or of a third nation,62 through the
mail,63 or directly through judicial officials or other competent persons of
either nation. 64 Many contracting nations have filed reservations, how-
ever, objecting to some or all of these procedures.65 Service can be made
directly through diplomatic or consular officials on nationals of the coun-
try of origin over the objection of the nation of destination.66 American
consular officials generally are not permitted to serve process in other
countries in private actions,67 with the notable exception of service upon
foreign governments under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.68
To obtain service under the Convention, the applicant must send dupli-
cate copies of the document to be served, a model form request,69 and a
model form summary of the document to be served. 70 The request need
not be legalized or authenticated formally before transmission to the cen-
tral authority.71 A request for service under the Convention can be made
only by someone authorized to serve process under the law of the jurisdic-
tion where the case is pending.72 In federal courts this individual is the
U.S. Marshal; in Texas it is usually a sheriff or constable. In some cases,
however, any disinterested person may serve process; therefore, if the court
appoints someone to carry out this task, the person appointed should state
60. Id
61. Id
62. Convention, supra note 2, art. 8. Documents may also be forwarded through consu-
lar channels to the officials of the state where service is to be made. Id art. 9.
63. Id art. 10(a).
64. Id art. 10(b)-(c).
65. For example, Egypt, Norway, and Turkey do not permit service by mail within their
territories; Belgium, Egypt, France, Luxembourg, and Norway will not allow diplomatic or
consular officials to serve process directly within their countries; Botswana, Denmark, Egypt,
Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and Turkey object to direct service through judicial offi-
cials or appointed persons of either the country of origin or the country of destination. 8
MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 4619-24 (1982).
66. Convention, supra note 2, art. 8.
67. 22 C.F.R. §§ 92.85, .92 (1981). Consular and diplomatic officials are allowed to
serve documents abroad, however, if express permission is &ranted by the State Department.
Id § 92.85. Such permission usually is given only for serving court-ordered subpoenas (id
§ 92.86), "show cause" orders in contempt proceedings (id § 92.87), and documents con-
cerning proceedings to revoke naturalization certificates (id § 92.90). See Department of
Justice Memo No. 386, at 18 (July 1979). Nevertheless, permission may be granted in excep-
tional circumstances when all other methods have been tried and have failed, provided that
the foreign law does not prohibit this means of service.
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4) (1976); 22 C.F.R. § 93.1 (1981); Department of State Memo-
randum on Judicial Assistance Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Service of
Process Upon a Foreign State (May 10, 1979), reprinted in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1177
(1979).
69. Convention, supra note 2, art. 3.
70. Id art. 5.
71. Id art. 3.
72. Id
1982] 1019
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in the request that he is authorized under Texas law and United States
practice to request the service. 73
The documents to be served should be sent by the American process
server directly to the foreign central authority by international air mail.74
No payment need accompany the request, and no transmittal letter or
other formality is required. 75 The country to which a request is sent can
refuse to serve the process only if it considers that the request does not
comply with the terms of the Convention,76 or that compliance would in-
fringe its sovereignty or security.77 It cannot refuse to comply solely be-
cause it claims exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit or
because its domestic law would not permit the action.78 If the central au-
thority refuses to execute a request because it does not conform to the
treaty's specifications, it is required to inform the applicant promptly and
to specify its objections. 79
III. TEXAS STATUTES AND RULES ON SERVICE ABROAD
Any analysis of the patchwork Texas statutory scheme for achieving
service of process upon nonresidents, including those residing in foreign
countries, must begin with article 203 lb.80 This provision generally is re-
garded as the long-arm statute in Texas, but it is actually only one of sev-
eral long-arm statutes and rules in the state.8 ' Others that will be
considered are article 2039a 82 and rule 108 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure.83 Rule 109,84 while not a long-arm provision as such, also af-
fords a means of service upon foreign residents in certain situations.
A. Article 2031b
Article 2031b was adopted in Texas in 1959 in the wake of the United
States Supreme Court's opinions in International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
73. Horlick, supra note 45, at 651 n.47. The person making the request should state
explicitly on the model form request: "Authorized to serve judicial process under Section 00
of the XYZ Code of Civil Procedure." Department of Justice Memo No. 386, at 14 n. II(July 1979).
74. Department of Justice Memo No. 386, at 16 (July 1979). For a list of the names and
addresses of the various central authorities, see id Appendix D.
75. Id at 16.
76. Convention, supra note 2, art. 4.
77. Id art. 13.
78. Id These claims arise most frequently out of American antitrust suits and maritime
proceedings. See Maechling, Uncle Sam's Long Arm, 63 A.B.A.J. 372, 376 (1977).
79. Convention, supra note 2, art. 4.
80. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1980-1981).
81. A discussion of all the Texas long-arm statutes is beyond the scope of this Article.
Other such statutes include: TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.10 (Vernon 1980) (foreign
corporations); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.26, 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981) (suits in-
volving divorce, annulment, and parent-child relationship); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts.
2033a, 2033b, 2033c (Vernon 1964) (suits against nonresident public utilities).
82. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2039a (Vernon 1964).




ton,8S Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. ,86 McGee v. International
Life Insurance Co. ,87 and Hanson v. Denckla.8 8 The courts have held con-
sistently that the purpose of article 2031 b was to extend the reach of Texas
jurisdiction to the limits of due process.89 The statute provides that any
nonresident company or person that engages in business in Texas will be
subject to the process of Texas courts by substituted service upon the Texas
Secretary of State. 90 The doing business requirement is defined in three
specific ways: (1) entering into a contract, by mail or otherwise, with a
resident of Texas, that is to be performed in whole or in part by either
party in Texas; (2) committing a tort in whole or in part in the state; or
(3) recruiting Texas residents, directly or indirectly, for employment at
any location.91 The reach of the statute is not limited to contacts based on
contracts, torts, and recruitment; it also includes a catch-all provision en-
compassing "other acts that may constitute doing business. '" 92 The scope
of this catch-all provision, however, is restricted to cases in which the cause
of action arises out of business done within the state.
93
Recent Texas decisions have greatly expanded the doing business test of
article 2031 b. In U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt the Texas Supreme
Court stated that in interpreting the statute Texas courts should "focus on
the constitutional limitations of due process rather than . . . engage in
technical and abstruse attempts to consistently define 'doing business.' 94
This attempt to obliterate the test will not be entirely effective, however, as
long as the "doing business" language remains part of the statute.
95
To uphold service under article 2031 b, the necessary requisites to its in-
vocation must be pleaded.96 Thus, the plaintiff must allege specifically
that the defendant does not maintain either a place of regular business or a
85. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
86. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
87. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
88. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
89. Walker v. Newgent, 583 F.2d 163, 167 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 906
(1979); Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 491 (5th Cir. 1974); Lone Star
Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 288 F.2d 69, 72-73 (5th Cir. 1961); Jamesbury
Corp. v. Kitamura Valve Mfg. Co., 484 F. Supp. 533, 536 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Docutel Corp. v.
S.A. Matra, 464 F. Supp. 1209, 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1979); U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt,
553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
90. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 3 (Vernon 1964).
91. Id § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981).
92. Id Professor Thode demonstrates the ambiguity of the phrase and its possible in-
terpretation as a restriction in Thode, In Personam Jurisdiction; Article 2031B, The Texas
"Long Arm" Jurisdiction Statute, and the Appearance to Challenge Jurisdiction in Texas and
Elsewhere, 42 TExAs L. REV. 279, 307-08 (1 964). See also Walker v. Newgent, 583 F.2d 163,
166-67 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 906 (1979); Gutierrez v. Raymond Int'l, Inc.,
484 F. Supp. 241, 247 (S.D. Tex. 1979). Such a reading, however, would be inconsistent with
the purpose of the statute.
93. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 3 (Vernon 1964).
94. 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
95. See Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260, 1267 (5th Cir. 1981); Weintraub,
supra note 26, at H-7 to -8, -12; Comment, L. ong-Arm Jurisdiction. Rule 108 as an Alternative
to "Doing Business" Under Article 2031b, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 99, 110 (1978).
96. McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex. 1965); Roberts Corp. v. Austin Co.,
487 S.W.2d 165, 166 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ refd n.r.c.).
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designated agent upon whom service may be made in Texas.97 Without
this allegation, the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
cannot be sustained under the statute.98 To uphold a default judgment, or
to withstand a challenge to service under the statute, the proof must estab-
lish that service was made upon the Texas Secretary of State and that the
secretary actually forwarded a copy of the process to the defendant by reg-
istered mail, return receipt requested. 99 This can be shown by offering into
evidence the secretary of state's certificate reciting that service was re-
ceived and forwarded to the defendant. 100
Few Texas cases have construed article 203 lb as it applies to defendants
in foreign countries. In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, SA. v.
Hall 0' a Texas court was faced with four wrongful death actions arising
from a helicopter crash in Peru. The defendant was a South American
corporation with its residence in Colombia, and the four decedents were
residents of Oklahoma, Illinois, Arizona, and South America. The court
discussed both due process requisites and the doing business requirement
of article 2031 b and concluded that the defendant was not amenable to the
jurisdiction of the Texas court. 10 2 Finding no tort committed by the de-
fendant in whole or in part in Texas, the court turned to the contract ques-
tion. The defendant had contracted with a joint venture to provide
helicopter transportation service in connection with the joint venture's
construction of a pipeline in Peru. All parties had agreed that Lima, Peru,
was the locus of the contract and that they would submit to Peruvian juris-
diction. Payments were made from the joint venture's bank in Texas to the
defendant's offices outside the state. The court determined that the con-
tract provision requiring payment from the main office of the joint venture
had no significant bearing on the contractual relations of the parties, even
if that main office was determined to be in Houston.
10 3
One other Texas case involves service of process on a party in another
country under article 2031 b;"°4 however, the opinion adds little to the
analysis of the statute. The court in Smith v. Reynolds focused upon the
failure of the defendant, a resident of Mexico, to prove by sufficient evi-
97. McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. 1965). TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 203 1b, § 3 (Vernon 1964) provides that a foreign corporation doing business in Texas,
but which does not maintain a regular place of business or a designated agent in the state, is
deemed to have appointed the Secretary of State of Texas as an agent upon whom service of
process may be made. In McKanna the Texas Supreme Court held that if a corporation
maintains a regular place of business in Texas, substituted service under § 3 is improper.
388 S.W.2d at 929-30.
98. Woodcock, Cummings, Taylor & French, Inc. v. Crosswell, 468 S.W.2d 864, 866
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston (1st Dist.] 1971, no writ); Harris v. Hayles, 433 S.W.2d 250, 252
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1968, no writ).
99. Prine v. American Hydrocarbons, Inc., 519 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-Aus-
tin 1975, no writ); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 203 1b, § 5 (Vernon 1964) (providing that
secretary of state shall mail a duplicate of service of process to nonresident defendant).
100. Whitney v. L&L Realty Corp., 500 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. 1973).
101. 616 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ granted).
102. Id at 251-52.
103. Id at 251.
104. Smith v. Reynolds, 533 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ).
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dence that he was not amenable to service from a Texas court. The deci-
sion thus fails to enhance interpretation of the statute.
Federal courts, noting the provisions of article 2031b, have held that a
defendant is not necessarily subject to the state's jurisdiction merely be-
cause it is party to a contract performable in whole or in part in Texas; the
contract must form the basis of the plaintiffs cause of action.10 5 Another
court has held that the place where the contract was made does not deter-
mine jurisdiction; rather, the place of performance is critical under Texas
law. 0 6 In Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau the Fifth Circuit held that
defendant CEMA was doing business in Texas within the meaning of the
statute because it entered into a contract performable in part in the state by
delivering certain reports and films made in France to plaintiffs office in
Dallas. 10 7 In Docutel Corp. v. S.A. Matra the court held that even though
the contract was made in France, it was performable almost wholly in
Texas, where the plaintiff manufactured the prototype of a specially
adapted automated teller. 08
Another decision has indicated that making numerous purchases of
goods and services from Texas companies constitutes doing business in
Texas,' °9 as does sending payments into Texas on a contract negotiated at
least partly in the state. 1 Jurisdiction of a tort claim has been held proper
when connected with a contract claim over which jurisdiction was shown;
although no tort claim arising in Texas was proved, the court reasoned that
article 2031 b extends as far as due process allows."' Another court has
indicated that a contractual contact with the forum state may be insuffi-
cient to support jurisdiction over a tort claim," 12 but the Fifth Circuit re-
cently rejected this view.' 3 For jurisdictional purposes, a plaintiff need
not prove the scope of the contract relied upon;" 4 its burden is merely to
make a prima facie showing of the facts on which jurisdiction is based, not
a prima facie demonstration of a cause of action." 5 Some federal courts
have held that the plaintiffs cause of action need not arise directly out of
105. Walker v. Newgent, 583 F.2d 163, 166 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 906
(1979); Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 491 (5th Cir. 1974); Reich v.
Signal Oil & Gas Co., 409 F. Supp. 846, 852 (S.D. Tex. 1974), aft'dmem., 530 F.2d 974 (5th
Cir. 1976). See also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 616 S.W.2d 247
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston list Dist.] 1981, writ granted).
106. Jamesbury Corp. v. Kitamura Valve Mfg. Co., 484 F. Supp. 533, 535 (S.D. Tex.
1980).
107. 495 F.2d 483, 492 (5th Cir. 1974).
108. 464 F. Supp. 1209, 1214-15 (N.D. Tex. 1979). But see U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v.
Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978). The cases can be
reconciled because Matra was not merely a passive customer of Docutel; in fact, Matra sent
employees to Dallas and conducted part of the negotiations there.
109. Navarro v. Sedco, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 1355, 1359 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
110. Western Desert, Inc. v. Chase Resources Corp., 460 F. Supp. 63, 66-67 (N.D. Tex.
1978).
111. Docutel Corp. v. S.A. Matra, 464 F. Supp. 1209, 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
112. Reich v. Signal Oil & Gas Co., 409 F. Supp. 846, 849-50 (S.D. Tex. 1974), affd
mem, 530 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1976).
113. Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260, 1270 (5th Cir. 1981).
114. Docutel Corp. v. S.A. Matra, 464 F. Supp. 1209, 1215 n.2 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
115. Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 490-91 (5th Cir. 1974).
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the defendant's contacts with Texas, even though article 2031b imposes
this requirement.'16
Notwithstanding the Texas Supreme Court's declaration that courts
should focus on due process limits rather than upon a technical construc-
tion of the law's wording, the most significant problem with article 2031b
is its restrictive language. By its express terms, the statute awards jurisdic-
tion to Texas courts over only those nonresidents that may be considered
to be doing business in the state. Moreover, the plaintiff's cause of action
must arise out of the business done in the state by the defendant. While
the purpose of the statute is to provide Texas courts with jurisdiction over
nonresidents to the extent allowed by due process, this cannot be achieved
completely within the limits of the doing business test, even when defined
as broadly as in the Texas statute. As long as this phrase remains the only
statutory basis of jurisdiction expressly authorized, it will lead to further
confusion of the due process requirements as they relate to this test." 17
Another problem besetting the statute, at least in international cases, is
that it provides for substituted service followed by mailing the papers to
the nonresident. Some countries do not recognize substituted service;"18
even more consider service by mail within their countries to be a violation
of their territorial sovereignty and have lodged protests over this practice
with the United States Department of State." l9 If the method of service
violates the law of the land where service is to be made (or simply is not
recognized by the foreign country as valid service) and the defendant's
assets are located there (as often will be the case), any judgment issued by
a Texas court based upon this service is unlikely to be recognized or en-
forced by the courts of that country.' 20
B. Article 2039a
Article 2039al 2l is the Texas nonresident motorist's statute, adopted in
1929 following the United States Supreme Court decision in Hess v. Pawl-
oski.' 22 Before the adoption of article 2031b, the nonresident motorist's
law was the most important long-arm statute in Texas. The gist of this law
is that any nonresident who avails himself of the rights, privileges, and
benefits of operating a motor vehicle in Texas is deemed to have appointed
the chairman of the Texas Highway Commission as his agent for service of
process in any civil action in Texas arising out of a motor vehicle accident
116. Jamesbury Corp. v. Kitamura Valve Mfg. Co., 484 F. Supp. 533, 536-37 n.3 (S.D.
Tex. 1980); Docutel Corp. v. S.A. Matra, 464 F. Supp. 1209, 1219-20 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
117. Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260, 1267 (5th Cir. 1981).
118. See Brenscheidt, The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in
the Federal Republic of Germany, II INT'L LAW. 261, 266 (1977).
119. Horlick, supra note 45, at 641.
120. Brenscheidt, supra note 118, at 265-66; Jones, International JudicialAssistance." Pro-
cedural Chaos and a Programfor Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515, 537 (1953).
121. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2039a (Vernon 1964).




in the state. 23 In order to invoke the statute, the plaintiff must allege the
nonresident status of the defendant and the occurrence of the accident
within the state.' 24 Proof of service for upholding a default judgment
should include evidence-usually a certificate from the chairman of the
Texas Highway Commission-showing that service was made upon the
chairman and forwarded by the commission to the defendant by registered
mail, postage prepaid, or by notice served upon the defendant personally
by any disinterested person.' 25 Article 2039a, when used with nonresi-
dents of the United States, is subject to problems similar to those involved
with article 2031 b because of its provision for substituted service and mail-
ing of process to the defendant. 126
In Rushing v. Bush,127 the only reported Texas case applying article
2039a to a citizen of another country, the Dallas court of civil appeals held
that the term "nonresident" is sufficiently broad to include a corporation
organized under the laws of a foreign country, in this case Mexico.' 28 The
court found in personam jurisdiction over the Mexican corporation based
upon a traffic accident in Dallas allegedly caused by the negligence of its
agent.' 29 The court also upheld service upon the chairman of the Texas
Highway Commission, because the record showed both service upon the
chairman and the forwarding of a copy of the process to the defendant in
Mexico.130
C Rule 108
Rule 108 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that notice may
be served upon a nonresident by any disinterested person who is compe-
tent to make an affidavit attesting to the service.1 3 1 Service upon a nonres-
ident may be made in the same manner as permitted for residents under
rule 106.132 These methods are: (1) delivery to the defendant in person,
or (2) mailing the process to the defendant by registered or certified mail,
with delivery restricted to the addressee only, return receipt requested. 133
When either of these methods has been tried and has failed, and an affida-
vit of such is filed showing the location of the defendant's usual place of
business or abode, service may be made upon court order: (1) by leaving
copies of the citation and petition at the usual place of business of the
party to be served or with anyone over sixteen years of age at the party's
123. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2039a, § I (Vernon 1964).
124. Gianelle v. Morgan, 514 S.W.2d 133, 134 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, no
writ).
125. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2039a, § 2 (Vernon 1964); see Rushing v. Bush, 260
S.W.2d 900, 903 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1953, writ dism'd).
126. See text accompanying notes 118-20 supra.
127. 260 S.W.900 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1953, writ dism'd).
128. Id at 905.
129. Id at 901-02.
130. Id. at 903.
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usual place of abode; or (2) in any other manner that the evidence before
the court indicates will be reasonably effective to give the defendant notice
of the Suit. 134
The last sentence of rule 108 provides:
A defendant served with. . . notice shall be required to appear and
answer in the same manner and time and under the same penalties as
if he had been personally served with a citation within this State to the
full extent that he may be required to appear and answer under the Con-
stitution of the United States in an action either in rem or in
personam. 135
This sentence has been interpreted as converting the rule on nonresident
service into a long-arm provision.136 Its purpose is to expand the scope of
the rule to the limits allowed by the due process clause.' 37 Unlike the
Texas long-arm statutes, rule 108 does not permit substituted service, but
concerns itself instead with the means of obtaining personal service upon
the nonresident. When personal delivery can be made, rule 108 provides
an alternate route for service. 138 Moreover, use of rule 108 may avoid the
requirement under article 2031b that the defendant be doing business in
the state.139 Any contacts that the defendant has with Texas that are ade-
quate to satisfy due process requirements will be sufficient to obtain either
in personam or in rem jurisdiction under rule 108.140 The plaintiff still
must show that the defendant's contacts with the state satisfy due process
requisites, but it need not allege the formal requirements of article
2031b. 141 In a proper case, personal service can be made under this rule
on a foreign merchant vessel in Texas waters. 142
In Dosamantes v. Dosamantes143 service was made on the defendant in
Mexico by pushing the papers under the door of his home. The court held
that this action was improper because the court never ordered this manner
of substituted service. '," While the trial court certainly could have author-
ized service in this manner, it was never requested to do so. Moreover, an
attempted personal service upon the defendant followed by his refusal to
134. Id 106(c)-(d), (f).
135. 1d 108 (emphasis added). The italicized clauses were added by order of the Texas
Supreme Court in 1975. Supreme Court of Texas, Civil Procedure Rules Amended, 38 TEX.
B.J. 823, 824 (1975).
136. Comment, supra note 95, at 109; Comment, Forum Non Conveniens: The Needfor
Legislation in Texas, 54 TEXAS L. REv. 737 (1976). Although one commentator noted that
the pre-amendment language of rule 108 seemed to make it a long-arm provision, it was not
interpreted as such by the courts. Thode, supra note 92, at 304-05 n. 165. See generally
Roumel v. Drill Well Oil Co., 270 F.2d 550, 554 (5th Cir. 1959). Accordingly, what has
changed is primarily the supreme court's construction of the rule.
137. Supreme Court of Texas, supra note 135, at 824; see U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v.
Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 n.I (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
138. Comment, supra note 95, at 109.
139. Id at 110.
140. Id at 103-04.
141. Id at 110-12.
142. TEX. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. M-285 (1968).
143. 500 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973, writ dism'd).
144. Id at 237.
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accept the papers was held invalid under rule 108 because delivery was
attempted in English, while defendant spoke only Spanish. 45 Neverthe-
less, the judgment for divorce and a child custody decree were affirmed
because the defendant failed to prove a meritorious defense to the plain-
tiffs action. 146
Substituted service under rules 106 and 108 was upheld in a divorce
action in Alvarez v. Alvarez. 147 Although the defendant resided in Mexico
at the time of service, the district judge authorized service upon Rapido
Forwarding Company, the defendant's usual place of business.' 48 Direct
evidence indicated that the company served neither was owned by nor was
the usual place of business of the defendant; other evidence, however, in-
cluded an assumed name certificate signed by him, which stated that he
was doing business under the name of Rapido Forwarding Company, and
a signature card at a local bank signed by the defendant for the purpose of
opening an account in the name of that company.'
49
One commentator has challenged the validity of the 1975 amendment to
rule 108 as violative of the Texas Constitution, 50 his argument being that
Texas statutes, especially article 2031b, determine the long-arm jurisdic-
tion of the Texas courts, and rule 108 is inconsistent with the statutes be-
cause it enlarges the courts' jurisdiction over nonresidents. Therefore, it is
outside the scope of the Texas Supreme Court's rulemaking power under
article V, section 25 of the Texas Constitution.' 5' The original purpose of
article 203 lb, however, as repeatedly announced by the courts, was to ex-
pand in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents to the extent permitted by
the United States Constitution. To that end, courts have gradually en-
larged the doing business language until its construction was expanded to
due process limits by the Texas Supreme Court's recent decision in U-
Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt.152 Although U-Anchor was decided two
years after the amendment of rule 108, its effect was to make the scope of
article 2031b coextensive with that of rule 108, thereby counteracting the
145. Id
* 146. Id at 238.
147. 476 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1972, no writ).
148. Id at 355-56.
149. Id at 357-59.
150. Letter to the Editor, from Prof. Hans W. Baade of the University of Texas Law
School, 38 TEX. B.J. 988 (1975). One federal court recently interpreted rule 108 as not being
a long-arm provision, but as providing merely an alternative means of serving process.
Boyd v. Piper Aircraft Corp., No. CA-3-80-1151-G (N.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 1981). The court
noted that the rule might be infirm under the Texas Constitution if construed otherwise. It is
highly unlikely, however, that the rule will be invalidated under the Texas Constitution both
for the reasons given in the text and because the final arbiter of such constitutionality is not
the federal courts, but the Texas Supreme Court, which adopted the rule. Moreover, it is
unrealistic to suggest that the Texas Supreme Court's footnote in U-Anchor Advertising,
Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 n.I (Tex. 1977), cen. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978), concerns
only the means of serving process; the court explicitly stated that "the purpose of the amend-
ment is to permit acuisition of in personam jurisdiction to the constitutional limits."
Clearer language that the court intended the rule to be a long-arm provision involving juris-
diction and not merely the means of service could not have been used.
151. Letter to the Editor, supra note 150.
152. 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
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argument that rule 108 is an enlargement or extension of long-arm juris-
diction in Texas. Accordingly, the rule merely makes explicit for Texas
jurisdiction what has been achieved already as a practical matter through
the various decisions interpreting article 2031b. The only real change,
therefore, is in the means by which service can be effected. The amended
rule provides a much needed way of obtaining personal, rather than substi-
tuted, service upon a nonresident, and certainly is a procedural matter
within the court's rulemaking authority. Under this analysis, the amend-
ment is merely a housekeeping matter, and is not an enlargement of Texas
law.
Even if the rule as amended did expand Texas jurisdiction, it would be
invalid under the Texas Constitution only if it is "inconsistent" with the
statute. 153 Because the purposes of the amendment and of article 2031b
are exactly the same, the two are not inconsistent. Rather, they are merely
two different means of achieving the same end. While rule 108 arguably is
also broader than article 2031b, because it does not require the plaintiff's
cause of action to be connected with his contacts with the state, such an
argument also fails to invalidate the rule because the court has imposed
the connection requirement in its declaration of due process requisites. 54
Rule 108 therefore provides a necessary procedure for foreign service of
process, and its validity should be sustained.
IV. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Extraterritorial service on a nonresident is governed in the federal courts
by rules 4(e) and (i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 55 Rule 4(e)
allows federal courts to make service on nonresidents in the manner pre-
scribed either by federal statutes or by the statutes and rules of court of the
state in which the federal court sits. 156 The rule is not a long-arm statute;
the basis of in personam jurisdiction must be found in the relevant state or
federal statute or rule of court. 57 This provision permits federal courts to
use Texas statutes and rules in diversity cases to obtain personal jurisdic-
tion over a defendant and to serve him abroad. 158
Rule 4(i) supplements, rather than supplants, rule 4(e) for obtaining
153. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 25.
154. See text accompanying note 40 supra. The Fifth Circuit in Prejean v. Sonatrach,
Inc., 652 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1981), correctly noted the statutory source of the nexus require-
ment and noted further that the United States Supreme Court has not required a nexus
between the cause of action and the forum if the defendant's activities in the forum are
substantial and continuous. Id at 1265-66. Nevertheless, the Texas Supreme Court has
read the nexus requirement into its analysis of due process, and this saves rule 108 from
violating the Texas Constitution.
155. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e), (i).
156. Id 4(e).
157. Horlick, supra note 45, at 639 n.l1.
158. See, e.g., Navarro v. Sedco, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 1355, 1357 n.l (S.D. Tex. 1978).
While rule 4(e) allows federal courts to use state statutes to obtain service outside the state in
which they sit, rule 4(d)(7) permits federal courts to use state statutes to serve the defendant
within the state. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(7), (e). Several courts, however, have erroneously
used these two provisions interchangeably. See Jamesbury Corp. v. Kitamura Valve Mfg.
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service of process in other countries. 59 Five methods of service abroad
are authorized. First, service may be made in the manner prescribed by
the law of the country in which the service is to be made. 160 This proce-
dure coincides with that permitted by article 5(a) of the Hague Conven-
tion. 161 The chief advantage of this approach is that this form of service is
more likely to be approved when an American judgment is later presented
to the foreign court for recognition and enforcement.162
The second method sanctioned by rule 4(i) is service as directed by the
foreign authority in response to an American letter rogatory, 63 provided
that the service is reasonably calculated to give actual notice to the defend-
ant. 164 The notice condition apparently was meant to apply to service ac-
cording to the internal law of the nation making the service as well,
although the punctuation in the rule makes this unclear. 65 The condition
should be understood as applying to both, because service must be reason-
ably calculated to give actual notice in order to pass constitutional mus-
ter.166 An application for a letter rogatory and for an authorization order
must be made to the court in which the suit is pending.' 67 Service by letter
rogatory is often time-consuming and difficult, but some nations do not
permit any other type of service within their territories. 68
Another approach to service allowed by the rules is personal service by
delivery to an individual or to an officer or managing or general agent of a
company. 69 Personal service may be made by any person who is not a
party to the action and who is at least eighteen years old."70 Under this
procedure, the plaintiff's attorney or his local counsel abroad can be desig-
nated to serve the process. 7' When available, this approach is obviously
the best procedure, because it guarantees actual notice to the defendant
Co., 484 F. Supp. 533, 534 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Gutierrez v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 484 F. Supp.
241, 244 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
159. Horlick, supra note 45, at 639.
160. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1)(A).
161. Convention, supra note 2, ar. 5(a).
162. See Brenscheidt, supra note 118, at 266; Horlick, supra note 45, at 640; Jones, supra
note 120, at 537.
163. "Letters rogatory are the medium, in effect, whereby one country, speaking through
one of its courts, requests another country, acting through its own courts and by methods of
court procedure peculiar thereto and entirely within the latter's control, to assist the admin-
istration of justice in the former country; such request being made, and being usually
granted, by reason of the comity existing between nations in ordinary peaceful times." The
Signe, 37 F. Supp. 819, 820 (E.D. La. 1941).
164. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(l)(B).
165. Advisory Committee's Note of 1963 to Subdivision (i), in J. MOORE, 2 MoorI's FED-
ERAL PRACTICE 4.01[25], at 4-36 (1981).
166. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Mili-
ken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
167. See Horlick, supra note 45, at 640-41.
168. Id at 641-42. Prior to the Convention, letters rogatory were the most common
method of international service by civil law nations. Jones, supra note 120, at 537.
169. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(l)(c).
170. Id 4(i).
171. See International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 593 F.2d 166, 174-75 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). The American attorney should always check the foreign counsel's
fee for serving process in his country before proceeding. In some countries, the process
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and is relatively simple and quick. 172 Direct personal service without per-
mission of the authorities, however, may violate the internal law of the
particular country in which service is to be executed. 73 In that case, con-
summating the service may be impossible. Even if service is executed, it
may prove a Pyrrhic victory if the judgment cannot be satisfied from assets
other than those located in the foreign country.
The federal rule also allows service by mail, addressed and dispatched
by the clerk of the court where the lawsuit is pending, and requires a
signed receipt. 174 This form of service is exceedingly easy, but its effective-
ness depends upon the willingness of the defendant to accept it. Without
the return receipt signed by the addressee, or some other evidence of actual
delivery, service cannot be sustained nor a judgment taken. In addition,
some countries prohibit service by mail within their territories and will not
recognize or enforce any judgment resulting therefrom. 175 Some govern-
ments assert that service by mail in another nation is inconsistent with
general principles of international law;176 the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals recently agreed with this proposition in the context of a Federal
Trade Commission subpoena sent by international mail to the Paris head-
quarters of a French company. 177 The court's opinion, however, implied
that service of a summons and complaint by mail would not violate inter-
national law. ' 78
Finally, rule 4(i) also contains a catch-all provision permitting service
abroad by any method ordered by the court. 179 Often the court will au-
thorize several types of service simultaneously, such as service both by per-
sonal delivery to an agent and upon the defendant by mail.'80 In
International Controls Corp. v. Vesco18' the court upheld service on a de-
fendant who had been served by throwing the document on his premises
and by mailing a copy to him. One observer suggested that courts han-
dling cases in the Iranian assets litigation authorize service of process by
server may charge a fee based on a percentage of the amount in controversy. See Jones,
supra note 120, at 536.
172. Horlick, supra note 45, at 642.
173. See, e.g., Gori-Montanelli & Botwinik, International Judicial Assistance-Ilay, 9
INT'L LAW. 717, 719-20 (1975).
174. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1)(D).
175. See Brenscheidt, supra note 118, at 264-66; Horlick, supra note 45, at 643.
176. See, e.g., FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 493 F. Supp. 286,
290 (D.D.C.), vacated, 636 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
177. FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1313 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
178. Id. The court of appeals noted the distinction between service of notice, the pur-
pose of which is informational, and service of compulsory process, which itself constitutes an
exercise of one country's sovereignty within the territory of another nation. Service of notice
by mail is a relatively benign procedure and is the least intrusive means of service by one
nation within the territory of another; service of compulsory process by mail, on the other
hand, is an infringement of the sovereignty of the nation where service is made and is maxi-
mally intrusive. Id
179. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(l)(E).
180. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. 262, 330 (E.D.
Pa. 1975); Levin v. Ruby Trading Corp., 248 F. Supp. 537, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
181. 593 F.2d 166, 177-78, 181-82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979).
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telex because telex communications with Iran were continuing on a regular
basis and because the revolutionary turmoil, the disruption of postal deliv-
eries, the lack of cooperation from local authorities, and the impossibility
of personal delivery made successful service by other methods unlikely. 8 2
Simultaneous use of several methods of service is a commendable practice
that should be encouraged in difficult cases.
V. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE HAGUE CONVENTION AND FEDERAL
AND STATE PROVISIONS
In evaluating the relationship between the Hague Convention and fed-
eral and state service provisions, the initial consideration is whether the
Convention is binding on state and federal courts. Because the Conven-
tion has not been enacted as legislation in the United States, it cannot be
part of our law unless it is self-executing, which in turn depends upon the
intent of the parties.' 83 If the treaty reflects an intention that it be imple-
mented in each contracting nation by specific legislation, then it is not self-
executing. I8 4 If it reflects the intention that it become a part of each coun-
try's domestic law immediately upon becoming effective, however, then it
is self-executing. 185 The fact that a treaty must be ratified-in the United
States upon the advice and consent of the Senate-does not prevent it from
being self-executing.
Article 1 of the Hague Convention declares that "[tihe present Conven-
tion shall apply in all cases, in civil or commercial matters, where there is
occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service
abroad."' 8 6 Article 19 provides that the Convention will not affect the in-
ternal law of a contracting nation insofar as that nation allows other meth-
ods of serving documents from abroad within its territory.' 87 Article 26
states that the Convention shall be open for signature and shall be rati-
fied,'88 while article 27 specifies the time when the Convention "shall enter
into force."' 89 Finally, article 29 states that any nation may declare at the
time it signs, ratifies, or accedes to the Convention that the Convention
shall extend to all or some of the territories for which the particular coun-
182. Comment by John E. Hoffman, Jr., of the New York Bar, at the Workshop on
Problems in Transnational Litigation in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 16, 1980). The workshop
was cosponsored by the International Law and Litigation Sections of the American Bar
Association. See New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Trans-
mission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 141(1)(A) (1965). See also 14 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 304, 309
(1970).
184. Aerovias Interamericanas de Panama, S.A. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 197 F.
Supp. 230, 245-46 (S.D. Fla. 1961), rev'don other grounds, 307 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 961 (1963); Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Pan Am. Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338, 340
(S.D.N.Y. 1944).
185. See note 184 supra.
186. Convention, supra note 2, art. 1.
187. Id art. 19.
188. Id art. 26.
189. Id art. 27.
19821 1031
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
try is responsible.' 90 Nowhere in the treaty is implementing legislation in
contracting states required for its effectiveness. Indeed, the provisions
manifest an intention that the Convention will become binding upon each
nation as soon as it is ratified and enters into force. The Convention en-
tered into force for the United States on February 10, 1969, after being
ratified properly. 191
A. Service of Process
The principal provision of the Convention is article 5, which sets out the
methods of service from which the central authority of the state addressed
may choose. 192 Article 5 states that the central authority "shall" serve the
document or see that it is served. 193 Article 8, however, provides that each
nation "shall be free" to serve documents through diplomatic or consular
agents;' 94 article 9 uses the same language in allowing documents to be
forwarded through consular channels for service abroad.' 95 Article 10
cautions that "the present Convention shall not interfere with" the free-
dom to send judicial documents by mail or by judicial officers, officials, or
other competent persons of either nation. 96 The language of these provi-
sions indicates, however, that they were not intended to authorize service
abroad by means of the methods specified therein unless internal law
otherwise authorizes these methods. While it has been stated that a treaty
can be self-executing in part and not self-executing in another part, 197 such
is not the case with the present Convention because the member nations
have not undertaken any obligation to enact domestic legislation to au-
thorize these service procedures. The Convention simply allows the coun-
tries to take advantage of these alternative methods if they choose to
authorize them and if the state of destination does not object. Clearly,
therefore, the Convention was intended to be self-executing and is binding
on the states as the supreme law of the land.198
Another question concerning the Convention and its interaction with
state and federal law is whether the Convention abrogates methods of
service allowed by Texas that are inconsistent with it. An Arizona appel-
late court has held that the Convention abrogates state rules and statutes
for service of process abroad insofar as the two are inconsistent. 99 In
Kadota v. Hosogai the defendant was served personally by a private pro-
190. Id art. 29. Both the United States and the United Kingdom have extended the
Convention to most of their territories. 8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 4622
n.14, 4624 n.15 (1982).
191. 8 MARTINDALE-HuBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 4619 (1982).
192. Convention, supra note 2, art. 5; see notes 49-79 supra and accompanying text.
193. Convention, supra note 2, art. 5.
194. Id art. 8.
195. Id art. 9.
196. Id art. 10.
197. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 738 (1943) (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
198. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See generally Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332
(1924).
199. Kadota v. Hosogai, 125 Ariz. App. 131, 608 P.2d 68, 73 (1980).
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cess server in Japan, in addition to receiving service by other means.200
Both Japan and the United States are parties to the Convention, but Japan
has objected to direct personal service within its territory under article
10(b) and (c).20 1 The Arizona court stated:
As a result of this objection, the treaty between Japan and the United
States is inconsistent with the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure to the
extent that personal service pursuant to Rule 4(e)(6)(iii) and Article
10(c) is objected to by Japan.
• ..The treaty between the United States and Japan specifically
prohibits this method of service, although the Arizona rules allow for
it. The law is clear that state statutes are abrogated to the extent that
they are inconsistent with a treaty.202
The Justice Department, however, has stated that the Convention does
not preempt other means of effecting service abroad, but rather supple-
ments those methods. 20 3 In a California case in which service was made
by mail in Japan, 2°4 the intermediate California appellate court declared:
"If it be assumed that the purpose of the convention is to establish one
method to avoid the difficulties and controversy attendant to the use of
other methods, it does not necessarily follow that other methods may not
be used if effective proof of delivery can be made.' '20 5 Other courts have
reached the same conclusion,20 6 but only in dicta. In Shoei Kako Co. v.
Superior Court20 7 service was made by mail directly to the defendant in
Japan. Article 10(a) of the Convention specifically authorizes service by
postal channels unless this method is objected to by the nation in which
service is made.208 Japan has not objected to this method of service, so the
method used in that case was not inconsistent with the Convention; actu-
ally it was authorized by the permissive terms of article 10(a). Likewise, in
Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L. 209 service was made directly on
the defendant in France by means of an appointed process server. Direct
personal service on a defendant abroad is authorized by article 10(b) of the
Convention, unless objection to this method is filed.210 Because France
has not entered any objection to this type of service within its territory, the
procedure used was consistent with the terms of the Convention. Thus,
broad statements by these courts regarding the use of state-approved meth-
200. 608 P.2d at 70.
201. Id at 72. See the declarations and reservations of the contracting nations, 8 MAR-
TINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 4619-24 (1982).
202. 608 P.2d at 73.
203. Justice Department Memo No. 386, at 13 n.10 (July 1979).
204. Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402, 407-08
(1973).
205. 109 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
206. See, e.g., International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 593 F.2d 166, 179-80 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979); Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 431 F. Supp. 1226,
1228 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
207. 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1973).
208. Convention, supra note 2, art. 10(a).
209. 431 F. Supp. 1226 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
210. Convention, supra note 2, art. 10(b).
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ods of service not sanctioned by the Convention are less persuasive prece-
dent than might be desired.
The Convention allows an applicant to request a particular method of
service, thus indicating an intention to mold the Convention around the
internal law of the contracting states to a great extent. While it allows
these countries considerable freedom to choose among several different
modes of serving process coming from other countries, however, it also
manifests an intention that service not be made by one contracting state in
another by methods other than those either mandated or permissively al-
lowed by the Convention. Article 19 states that the Convention shall not
affect the internal law of a contracting country insofar as it permits other
methods of serving process from abroad within its territory. 2 11 The clear
implication of this provision is that the Convention will supersede the do-
mestic law of a nation only to the extent that it provides alternative means
of serving process in other countries for litigation within that nation's
territory.
The analysis by the Arizona intermediate appellate court in Kadota v.
Hosogai,212 which invalidated service of process made in Japan by direct
personal service through an appointed process server, therefore is basically
correct: Japan had entered its reservation objecting to subparagraphs (b)
and (c) of article 10 of the Convention.213 This important difference dist-
inguishes Kadota from the federal court's holding in Tamari v. Bache &
Co. (Lebanon) SA.L. 21 4 As the Arizona court noted, if the treaty's meth-
ods of service were held to be merely supplementary to those provided by
the federal and state governments, Japan's objections to this method of
service within its territory would be meaningless.21 .5 Such service would
violate treaty obligations and could touch sensitive diplomatic nerves, trig-
gering diplomatic protests against American judicial imperialism. More-
over, if the manner of service violated Japan's internal law as well, the
court, by authorizing this service, could be fostering disrespect for a for-
eign country's laws within its own territory and, in some cases, service
could subject the parties or the appointed process server to criminal sanc-
tions.216 Comity militates against such arrogance when other methods of
achieving service are provided. American courts and litigants should not
be eager to give offense.
The Arizona court's statement that the Convention "abrogated" incon-
211. Id art. 19. Article 19 differs from article 5(a) in that the latter refers to the methods
prescribed by the internal law of the nation for service upon persons resident therein in suits
pending in its own territory; while article 19 applies to the methods allowed by the internal
law of the country for service in its territory for suits pending in other nations. Thus, if a
country already has provided specific means for serving documents from other countries,
this law will remain undisturbed by the Convention. Id art. 19.
212. 125 Ariz. App. 131, 608 P.2d 68 (1980).
213. 8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 4620 n.9 (1982).
214. 431 F. Supp. 1226 (N.D. II. 1977).
215. 608 P.2d at 73.
216. See note 231 infra.
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sistent Arizona procedural rules2 17 perhaps is too broad. The Convention
provides that the nation in which litigation is pending may serve process
under the specific terms of article 5, which must be honored by the nation
addressed, or by any of the methods provided in articles 8, 9, and 10, un-
less objection is made. 218 Some nations have filed objections to the proce-
dures provided in articles 8, 9, and 10;219 others have not. Certainly
Arizona's procedural rules for service abroad are not abrogated totally by
the Convention; neither is any particular procedure abrogated because one
nation has objected to its use within its territory. The method is merely
inapplicable to service in the nation that has objected to its use; it remains
available in other nations that have not done so.
The courts in both Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L. 220 and Shoei
Kako Co. v. Superior Court221 articulated an alternative basis for their
holdings that the service made on the defendant was valid under the Con-
vention: in both cases nothing indicated that the defendant had not ac-
cepted the document voluntarily. Article 5 of the Convention provides
that service always may be made by delivery to a person who accepts vol-
untarily.222 In Shoe Kako service was made by mail, while in Tamari
service was made personally on the defendant in France. The voluntary
acceptance method of article 5 was used by the courts as a catch-all provi-
sion. The voluntary acceptance method was added at the instigation of the
Western European countries, which use it frequently.223 The placement of
this provision in article 5, which deals with service only by the central
authority of the nation addressed, strongly indicates that the method does
not apply to direct delivery from the requesting court or its designated
process server; furthermore, the method is limited by the language in arti-
cle 5 that it not be incompatible with the domestic law of the nation ad-
dressed. 224 Voluntary acceptance certainly would not authorize a country
to serve process by mail in another nation that had filed an objection to
article 10(a) of the Convention, or by personal delivery in a country that
had objected to subparagraphs (b) and (c) of article 10. Clearly it was not
intended to be a catch-all provision, and cannot be used as such by Ameri-
217. 608 P.2d at 73; see text accompanying notes 199-202 supra.
218. See notes 192-96 supra and accompanying text.
219. 8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 4619-22 (1982).
220. 431 F. Supp. 1226, 1229 (N.D. IlL. 1977).
221. 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402, 411 (1973).
222. Convention, supra note 2, art. 5.
223. See text accompanying notes 58-61 supra.
224. Article 5 provides m part:
The Central Authority of the State addressed shall itself serve the document or
shall arrange to have it served by an appropriate agency, either-
(a) by a method prescribed by its internal law for the service of documents in
domestic actions upon persons who are within its territory, or
(b) by a particular method requested by the appellant, unless such a method
is incompatible with the law of the State addressed.
Subject to subparagraph (b) of the first paragraph of this article, the docu-
ment may always be served by delivery to an addressee who accepts it
voluntarily.
Convention, supra note 2, art. 5.
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can courts. If used as a catch-all procedure, the voluntary acceptance
method would expand rapidly to consume almost every situation, and the
benefits and limitations contracted for by the ratifying nations would be
lost.
Further inquiry into the relationship between the Convention and fed-
eral and state service provisions raises the question: Does the Convention
authorize service according to its terms regardless of whether the method
used is authorized by Texas law? This question requires an affirmative
answer. According to the Convention's first article, it applies in all cases in
civil or commercial matters. 225 A contracting nation whose law on service
is narrower than that permitted by the Convention nevertheless is required
to make or allow service within its territory by any of the methods pro-
vided for within the Convention (except for those provided in articles 8, 9,
or 10, if the country has objected to them). The corollary also must be
true: when the law of the nation requesting service is narrower than the
procedures mandated by the Convention in article 5, the Convention still
authorizes service by these means.226 Articles 8, 9, and 10 merely provide
optional methods of service that can be used only if the law of the state of
origin authorizes them independently of the terms of the Convention. By
specifying in article 5 the methods of service from which the state of desti-
nation can choose in making service within its territory, the Convention
implicitly requires the nation of origin to recognize service made by one of
these methods. Thus, any court in the United States can recognize service
made in accordance with article 5 of the Convention unless due process
requirements are violated, in which case the Convention would be uncon-
stitutional to that extent.
Questions would arise only if the foreign authority served process in
some manner permitted by its internal law, but not authorized by Texas
law. Most Texas procedures are compatible with the methods allowed by
the Hague Convention and could be used as a basis for a request for serv-
ice under the treaty even if the treaty's terms did not provide sufficient
authorization. For example, because rule 108 allows service by personal
delivery to the defendant by any disinterested person who is at least eight-
een years of age,227 it will permit a request to the central authority of a
contracting nation for service to be made in this manner.
Problems also could arise if service is made by leaving the process at the
usual place of business or abode of the defendant when other means had
not been tried first. Rule 108 provides a hierarchy for service and allows
service to be made by a procedure ordered by the court. Some parties to
the Convention--such as Egypt, Norway, and Turkey-prohibit direct
225. Id art. 1.
226. See Note, The Effect of the Hague Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and
Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 2 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 125, 131-32(1969).
227. TEx. R. Civ. P. 108; see notes 131-54 supra and accompanying text.
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personal service and service by mail within their territories.228 Many
countries that are not parties to the Convention also prohibit these meth-
ods; for example, Italy prohibits direct personal service within its territory
without prior authorization,229 and Switzerland will not allow service by
mail within its boundaries. 230 Requiring that a plaintiff attempt service in
one of these ways in a country that objects to the service is futile at best
and may even subject the process server to criminal prosecution in the
nation of service. 231 Texas procedures should not require a party to sub-
ject himself or his agents to liability abroad when other methods are
available.
The relationship between articles 2031b and 2039a and the Convention
also requires examination. Service is made under the Texas statutes by
delivery of process to Texas officials and by their forwarding of the papers
to the defendant by mail.2 3 2 Many European countries have a similar
service procedure called "notification auparquet. ' ' 233 Process is served by
delivery to a domestic court official, and the local authorities attempt to
give notice to the defendant abroad through diplomatic channels or by
other methods, but the failure to give the defendant notice does not affect
the validity of the service. 234 The Convention applies where a judicial
document is transmitted for service abroad. It does not provide expressly
for service upon an official of the nation where the suit is pending. Con-
sider, then, whether the Texas procedure comes within the terms of the
Convention, and if so, whether it is allowed or abrogated. If the Texas
methodology does fall within the Convention's provisions, it must come
under the permissive terms of article 10, which states that the "present
Convention shall not interfere with" service by mail unless objection is
made.235 The question is not a simple one, and its answer should not turn
upon a technical decision whether the service is the receipt of the docu-
ments by the defendant or the delivery to the Texas official and his for-
warding of the documents by mail. Clearly the documents must be
forwarded by mail by the Texas official, or the service is not complete.236
Because the mailing of the papers to the defendant is an integral part of
this procedure for service, it arguably falls within the permissive terms of
article 10(a) and is not abrogated by the Convention. The method may be
inapplicable, however, if the defendant resides in a country that has rati-
228. See the declarations and reservations filed by the contracting parties, 8 MARTIN-
DALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 4619-24 (1982).
229. See Gori-Montanelli & Botwinik, supra note 173, at 719.
230. See Horick, supra note 45, at 641.
231. See Gori-Montanelli & Botwinik, supra note 173, at 719-20; Jones, supra note 120,
at 520; Justice Department Memo No. 386, at 17 (July 1979). An SEC staff attorney was
indicted for servin& an administrative subpoena in France and an Assistant U.S. Attorney
was sued for malicious trespass for serving a subpoena in the Bahamas. Id at 20.
232. See notes 90-130 supra and accompanying text.
233. See Note, supra note 226, at 134.
234. Amram, supra note 48, at 653.
235. Convention, supra note 2, art. 10.
236. See note 99 supra.
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fled the Convention and also has objected to service by mail.237 This mat-
ter is not merely an academic question; its resolution determines whether
the Convention's terms regarding taking and opening default judgments
apply. 238 One method of proceeding that would resolve these potential
problems is to request the Texas official to mail the documents to the cen-
tral authority of the country where the defendant resides. The central au-
thority then would accomplish service in conformity with the terms of the
Convention. In that case, the Convention's terms on default judgments
clearly would apply.
The most common method of making service of process in civil law
countries that are not parties to the Convention is by letter rogatory.
2 39
Indeed, some countries permit no other kind of service within their bound-
aries.240 Texas law does not authorize this type of service expressly. In
another context, however, the Texas Supreme Court has held that Texas
courts have inherent power to honor letters rogatory from other jurisdic-
tions.24' No reason exists to prevent Texas courts from having the inher-
ent power to issue letters rogatory to serve documents abroad. This
authority is necessary in aid of the court's jurisdiction in a proper case;
without it, legal service cannot be made in nations such as Switzerland,
and a Texas judgment that cannot be satisfied from assets other than those
abroad will be ineffective. Texas courts have an interest in seeing their
judgments recognized and enforced in other jurisdictions, just as they have
an interest in seeing that their jurisdiction is not frustrated by a failure to
serve the defendant. Furthermore, when means are available for making
service of process abroad in a legal manner, Texas courts have some re-
sponsibility based upon comity to prevent the service of process in a man-
ner illegal in the territory where the documents are served.
B Proof of Service
Upon completion of service under the Convention, the central authority
of the state of destination must execute a model certificate stating that the
document has been served; the certificate must list the method of service,
the place and the date of service, and the person to whom the document
was delivered.242 If the document was not served, the certificate must state
this fact and enumerate the factors that prevented service.243
The federal rules authorize proof of foreign service by the normal
method of return, by the method provided by the law of the country where
237. See Note, supra note 226, at 134.
238. See text accompanying notes 251-88 infra. One member of the United States dele-
gation to the negotiations that led to the Convention has declared that the default judgment
provisions of the Convention were intended to apply to the European system of "notification
auparquel." Amram, supra note 48, at 653.
239. Jones, supra note 120, at 537.
240. Horlick, pra note 45, at 641.
241. Ex parte Taylor, 110 Tex. 331, 334, 220 S.W. 74, 75 (1920).




service is made, or by order of the court.244 Service by mail is proved by
signed receipt or by other evidence of delivery.2 45 Rule 107 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure 246 provides that the officer making service shall
endorse or attach the return to the citation, shall state when the citation
was served and the manner of service, and shall sign it officially. When
service is made by mail, the officer also must make a return of service and
attach the return receipt with the addressee's signature. 247 The court can
order the manner of making proof of service when the citation is executed
by one of the alternative means provided in rule 106.248
Article 6 of the Convention relating to proof of service is mandatory and
therefore binding on state and federal courts.249 When return is made in
accordance with this provision, state and federal courts must recognize it
as valid proof of service, regardless of whether it meets the other require-
ments of rule 107 or rule 4(i)(2). Both rule 107 and rule 4(i)(2) should be
amended specifically to permit return of service made according to the
terms of any applicable convention or treaty; rule 107 should be amended
expressly to authorize return of service in the manner authorized by the
internal law of a country where service is made. Some countries do not
require an affidavit or sworn proof of service, and such proof is nearly
impossible to obtain in certain other nations. 250 A Texas court ordering
service in a non-Convention country under one of the alternative methods
provided in rule 106 should be sensitive to this problem and should not
require a return of service that cannot practically be obtained from a pro-
cess server abroad.
C Default Judgments
The Convention also contains a provision for the taking of default judg-
ments. Article 15 declares that no judgment shall be given following serv-
ice under the Convention until the document is shown to have been served
in ample time to allow the defendant to appear and defend.25' A con-
tracting nation may declare, however, that a judgment may be awarded
notwithstanding the absence of a certificate of service if the document was
served pursuant to a method permitted by the Convention, if at least six
months have elapsed since transmission of the document, and if every rea-
sonable effort has been made to obtain a certificate of service. 252
In federal suits the defendant has twenty days from the date on which he
244. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(2). The provision allowing proof of service to be made accord-
ing to the law of the country where service is made is quite important, because obtaining a
sworn return in some nations is almost impossible. Jones, supra note 120, at 537.
245. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(2).
246. TEx. R. Civ. P. 107.
247. Id
248. Id 106; see notes 133-34 upra and accompanying text.
249. Convention, supra note 2, art. 6.
250. See note 244 supra.




is served with a summons to appear and answer the complaint. 253 The
person serving the process is required to make prompt proof of service, at
least within the twenty-day response period.254 A failure to make proof of
service, however, does not affect the validity of the service.255 If the de-
fendant does not file an answer, a responsive pleading, or a motion of
some sort, a default entry on a liquidated claim may be made by the clerk
and a default judgment entered by the court. 256
Under Texas procedure a defendant generally is required to answer by
10:00 a.m. on the Monday following the expiration of twenty days after the
date of service of process.257 When the defendant is served personally in a
foreign country, however, he is required to answer by 10:00 a.m. on the
Monday following the expiration of twenty days after the return day of the
citation or notice.258 If no answer is filed by answer day, the plaintiff may
take a default judgment.259 No default judgment can be taken against a
defendant unless the citation showing proof of service has been on file for
at least ten days prior to the taking of the default.260
The Convention's general default judgment provision requiring suffi-
cient time to defend is mandatory and binding on state and federal
courts.26' The six-month waiting period exception that article 15 provides
is not, however, binding upon state and federal courts. The exception au-
thorizes member governments to file a formal declaration that it will per-
mit the taking of a default upon failure to obtain a certificate for six
months after service despite reasonable efforts to do SO, 2 6 2 but it does not
mandate or otherwise authorize the taking of a default in this way absent a
declaration. The United States has filed such a declaration.263
The mandatory default provision of the Convention will work no
change in general federal law or in service under rule 108, because the date
of service must be established before one can determine the time in which
the defendant is required to answer. If the time for answer has not run, no
default can be entered. A default judgment after service made according
to the terms of articles 203 lb or 2039a, however, may be changed by this
provision. Under these statutes, a default is allowed in Texas when the
plaintiff shows that delivery of the citation and petition to the Texas offi-
cial was accomplished and that he forwarded the documents by registered
or certified mail to the defendant.264 This showing probably does not com-
ply with that required by the Convention for establishing that delivery to




257. TEX. R. Civ. P. 101, 237.
258. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2092 (Vernon 1964).
259. Id; TEX. R. Civ. P. 239.
260. TEX. R. Civ. P. 107, 239.
261. Convention, supra note 2, art. 15.
262. Amram, supra note 48, at 653.
263. 8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 4617, 4624 (1982).
264. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 2031b, 2039b (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1980-1981).
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the defendant was effected in sufficient time to enable him to answer and
defend. If the plaintiff files the return receipt or a certificate from the
Texas official showing delivery to the defendant, however, and the time for
answering and appearing has run, the provisions of the Convention will be
satisfied. In construing service under the Convention pursuant to articles
203 1b or 2039a, Texas courts should hold that a default judgment cannot
be taken against a defendant unless a showing is made that he actually
received the process and was given the normal time for answering
thereafter.
Even though no Texas or federal provisions have been adopted concern-
ing the six-month exception to the mandatory default rule of article 15 of
the Convention, the exception is, nevertheless, binding on state and federal
courts. The federal government's declaration approving the exception was
filed in accordance with the terms of the treaty and became part of the
domestic law of the country much like a reservation or statement of under-
standing. 265 American law, however, usually requires a showing of notice
to the defendant, and a default judgment entered in accordance with the
exception might not withstand constitutional scrutiny.
In some circumstances a default judgment may be vacated when service
was made under the Convention. Such relief is available only if the de-
fendant, with no fault on his part, lacked knowledge of the document in
sufficient time to defend, or knowledge of the judgment in sufficient time
to appeal. The defendant also must disclose a prima facie defense to the
action on the merits.266 An application for relief from the judgment must
be made within a reasonable time after the defendant obtains knowledge
of the judgment.267 A definite time limit for filing an application for relief
may be set, but it cannot be less than one year. 268
A default entry by the clerk in federal court may be set aside upon a
showing of good cause.269 A default judgment by the court, however, may
be set aside only upon a showing of: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud, misrepre-
sentation, or misconduct of an adverse party; (4) voidness of the judg-
ment; (5) satisfaction, release, or discharge of the judgment; or (6) other
justifiable reasons. 270 Federal courts also generally require a showing of a
meritorious defense that may make the outcome of the suit different.271
The motion for relief from the default judgment must be made within a
reasonable time; for the first three categories listed above, the motion must
be made within one year after the judgment is entered.272
265. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 134-135 (1965).
266. Convention, supra note 2, art. 16.
267. Id
268. Id
269. FED. R. Civ. P. 55(c).
270. Id 55(c), 60(b).
271. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2697, at 342
(1973).
272. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
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In Texas a motion for new trial may be filed within thirty days after the
entry of the judgment, and a trial court has plenary power to set aside the
judgment for good cause shown. 273 If a motion for new trial is not filed
within thirty days, the judgment may be set aside in Texas only upon a bill
of review proceeding for sufficient cause.274 To obtain relief from a de-
fault judgment upon a bill of review hearing, the moving party must show
that: (1) a meritorious defense to-the cause of action exists; (2) the de-
fendant was prevented from making his defense by the fraud, accident, or
wrongful act of the opposite party; and (3) the defendant was not at fault
or negligent in failing to answer and defend.275 Reliance upon erroneous
official information that prevented the defendant from timely answering
and defending or from timely filing a motion for new trial will excuse
proof of the second element. 276 The defendant may make out a prima
facie meritorious case by showing that his defense is not barred as a matter
of law and that he would be entitled to judgment on retrial if no evidence
to the contrary is offered. 277 Prima facie proof may be based upon affida-
vits, documents, or other proper evidence. 278 If the defendant presents a
prima facie meritorious defense, the court will conduct a trial; the defend-
ant then has the burden of proving that the judgment was rendered as a
result of fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposite party, or official
mistake, and that the defendant was not at fault or negligent in any way.2 79
The Convention's terms with respect to vacating a default judgment are
mandatory. 280 This provision does not apply, however, until the defend-
ant discloses a prima facie defense; furthermore, he must show that he
lacked knowledge of the document in time to defend or knowledge of the
judgment in time to appeal, with no fault on his part.28' This generally
accords with Texas procedure, which was established recently by the Texas
Supreme Court in Baker v. Goldsmith.282 The Convention negates the
Texas requirement that the judgment must have been rendered as a result
of fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposite party, or official mistake.
When personal service is made on the defendant, the Texas provision will
not apply, because the defendant obviously will have had knowledge of
the document in time to defend. The Convention provision can be recon-
ciled with the federal procedure because the sixth provision of rule 60(b)
provides for relieving a defendant from a judgment for any justifiable rea-
son.283 In accordance with the terms of the Convention, the United States
273. TEx. R. Civ. P. 320, 329b(a), (d)-(e).
274. Id 329b(f).
275. Baker v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 406-07 (Tex. 1979) (noting Alexander v.
Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 568, 226 S.W.2d 996, 998 (1950)).
276. 582 S.W.2d at 407.
277. Id at 408-09.
278. Id at 409.
279. Id
280. Convention, supra note 2, art. 16.
281. Id
282. 582 S.W.2d 404, 409 (Tex. 1979).
283. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).
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has declared that an application for relief will not be entertained after the
later of one year from the date of the judgment or the time period allowed
by the procedural regulations of the court in which the judgment has been
entered. 284 The effect of this declaration is that an American court must
entertain an application for relief from a default judgment made under the
mandatory terms of the Convention within at least one year following the
entry of the judgment.285 This comports with federal law and will not
change Texas procedures expressly.
Article 16 states that the judge "shall have the power to relieve the de-
fendant from the effects of the expiration of the time for appeal from the
judgment. '286 This language at first glance seems to imply that the Con-
vention does not provide a mandatory section concerning relief from the
judgment itself, but merely allows extra time for appeal. This construction
is belied, however, by the statement of conditions that must be fulfilled
before the judge may exercise this power. Among these conditions is proof
of the defendant's lack of knowledge of the document in time to defend or
lack of knowledge of the judgment in time to appeal. 287 Because a defend-
ant may lack knowledge of the complaint before a default judgment is
taken, but gain knowledge of the judgment in time to appeal, the first con-
dition would be meaningless unless the judge is awarded the power to set
aside the judgment for a new trial when the conditions are satisfied. The
Convention does not apply when the address of the person to be served is
unknown, 288 so the Convention's provision for setting aside a default judg-
ment cannot be used when the default is based upon citation by publica-
tion and the defendant's address is unknown.
In International Corporate Enterprises, Inc. v. Toshoku Ltd 289 the court
refused to set aside a default judgment against a Japanese corporation,
concluding that the defendant's failure to answer was due to gross careless-
ness on its part and not to excusable neglect, mistake, or inadvertence.
Defendant was served under article 203 lb of the Texas statutes; a copy of
the summons and complaint was received by defendant's mail department
and forwarded to its chemical department. The person who read English
documents for the company glanced at the document and filed it away.
The court determined that a foreign company doing business in Texas has
a responsibility to ensure that its internal procedures will allow it to be
responsive to legal proceedings in the state.290 Although the court made
no mention of the Convention, its provision granting relief from default
judgments probably would not have benefitted the defendant, because it
apparently had knowledge of the document in time to defend.
284. See the declarations of the United States, 8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIREC-
TORY 4624 n.15 (1982).
285. See note 268 supra.
286. Convention, supra note 2, art. 16.
287. Id art. 16.
288. Id art. 1.
289. 71 F.R.D. 215 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
290. id at 218.
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VI. ALTERNATIVES TO SERVICE ABROAD
Texas law also provides methods by which a foreign defendant in some
circumstances can be brought before the court without service outside the
boundaries of the state. Three such procedures are attachment of prop-
erty, service upon an agent, and publicized process.
A. Attachment
Federal law makes available in federal actions all remedies for seizure
of a defendant's property in satisfaction of a judgment that are allowed by
the law of the state in which the district court sits.29 1 Courts have con-
strued this statute as allowing prejudgment attachment of the defendant's
assets in order to obtain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over the defendant in a
federal lawsuit. 292 Two provisions of Texas law provide for obtaining in
rem jurisdiction over property found within the state but owned by a non-
resident. Article 275 declares that a court may issue a writ of attachment
before judgment based upon an affidavit presented by the plaintiff or his
attorney showing: (1) that the defendant is justly indebted to the plaintiff
for a specified amount, and (2) that the defendant is either not a resident
of the state or is a foreign corporation.293 Article 281 provides that Texas
courts may issue writs of attachment in suits founded upon torts or unliq-
uidated demands when personal service cannot be obtained upon the de-
fendant within the state.294
As a prerequisite to the issuance of an attachment order, the plaintiff
must execute a bond conditioned upon his paying all damages and costs
that might arise should the attachment be adjudged wrongful. 295 The
property must actually be attached by the court before an in rem judgment
can be issued.296 Of course, the property attached must have some connec-
tion to the plaintiff's cause of action for the attachment to comport with
due process of law. 297 A writ of attachment can be issued only upon a
written court order entered after a hearing,298 which may be ex parte. 299
The trial court is required to make specific findings of fact to support the
statutory grounds for issuance of the writ.3°° The writ must be in the form
specified by rule 598a 30 1 and must inform the defendant of his right to
replevy the property or to file a motion to dissolve the writ.30 2
A defendant wishing to challenge the attachment must file a sworn mo-
.291. FED. R. Civ. P. 64,
292. National Am. Corp. v. Federal Repub. of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 633 n.16
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), aft'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979).
293. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 275 (Vernon 1973).
294. Id art. 281.
295. I d art. 279.
296. See Banco Minero v. Ross, 106 Tex. 522, 535, 172 S.W. 711, 713 (1915).
297. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1977).







tion praying that the writ be vacated, dissolved, or modified and stating the
grounds therefor.30 3 The motion must admit or deny each of the trial
court's findings or state the reasons why such cannot be done.3°4 The court
is required to hold a hearing on the motion promptly, after reasonable
notice to the plaintiff, which may be less than the customary three-day
minimum. 30 5 The court must rule upon the motion within ten days after it
is filed.3°6 The burden of persuasion at the hearing is upon the plaintiff to
prove the grounds of issuance of the writ; the movant has the burden of
persuading the court either that the value of the property attached exceeds
the amount necessary to secure the debt, or that certain other property
should be substituted for the property actually attached. 30 7 Despite these
safeguards, some doubt remains as to the constitutionality of the Texas
attachment statutes, even when used in conjunction with due process guar-
antees not specified in the statutes.308
B. Service upon Resident Agents
All foreign corporations authorized to transact business in Texas are re-
quired to maintain a registered agent in the state.309 A nonresident corpo-
ration can always be served by delivery of process to its registered agent
within the state.310 Any foreign corporation that engages in business in
Texas and is not required to maintain a registered agent may be served by
delivery of process to the person in charge of its business within the
state.31' Under the federal rules, service can be made on a managing or
general agent of the defendant.312
Service upon a parent or subsidiary corporation is not considered service
upon the other merely because of this corporate relationship. 31 3 Common
stock ownership and identity of officers do not establish an agency rela-
tionship between corporations. 314 An agency relationship sufficient to jus-
tify service upon the agent may be found where one corporation is the
"alter ego" of another 315 or where one corporation exercises a sufficient
degree of control over the activities of the other.316 The possibility of find-






308. 6 L. LowE, TEXAS PRACTICE: REMEDIES § 692 (2d ed. Supp. 1979).
309. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.08A(2) (Vernon 1980).
310. Id art. 8.1OA.
311. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 203 1b, § 2 (Vernon 1964).
312. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1)(c).
313. See Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 336-37 (1925); Gutier-
rez v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 241, 253 (S.D. Tex. 1979); Murdock v. Volvo of Am.
Corp., 403 F. Supp. 55, 57 (N.D. Tex. 1975). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note
21,§ 52, Comment b.
314. Turner v. Jack Tar Grand Bahama, Ltd., 353 F.2d 954, 956 (5th Cir. 1965).
315. See Murdock v. Volvo of Am. Corp., 403 F. Supp. 55, 57 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
316. Turner v. Jack Tar Grand Bahama, Ltd., 353 F.2d 954, 956 (5th Cir. 1965);
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 616 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Tex. Civ. App.-
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consuming procedures and is worth investigation.317
C Service by Publication
Another means of obtaining service upon a foreign defendant is by pub-
lication under rule 109 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.318 Under
rule 109 service by publication generally can be used only when the plain-
tiff or his attorney makes an affidavit stating that: (1) the defendant's resi-
dence is unknown, (2) the plaintiff and his attorney have been unable to
locate the defendant after due diligence, and (3) personal service upon the
nonresident defendant has been attempted under rule 108 and has
failed. 319 When the defendant is shown to be outside the United States,
however, the plaintiff need not show that the whereabouts of the defendant
are unknown or that an attempt has been made to serve the defendant
personally under rule 108.320 Under Texas law, therefore, a defendant out
of the country may be served by publication in the first instance.
If service of citation is to be made by publication, it must meet the re-
quirements of rule 114.321 Service of citation is made by having the sheriff
or constable publish the citation once each week for four consecutive
weeks.322 Because the rule for citation by publication is strictly con-
strued,323 the plaintiff must follow it carefully. Service in this manner is
not favored because usually it will not come to the attention of the defend-
ant in time for him to respond.324 The fiction that service by publication
Houston [ist Dist.] 1981, writ granted). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 21,
§ 52, Comment b.
317. The general authority in Texas is that service upon a subsidiary within the state is
not service upon the parent located outside the state. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Stevens, 109
Tex. 262, 268-69, 206 S.W. 921, 922 (1918); Country Clubs, Inc. v. Ward, 461 S.W.2d 651,
658 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writ refd n.r.e.). The holding in Stevens was based upon
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Peterson v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 205 U.S.
364 (1907), and purported to overrule the earlier Texas Supreme Court decision in Buie v.
Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 95 Tex. 51, 65 S.W. 27 (1901). Buie had held that service upon the
nonresident corporation's local subsidiary was service upon the parent. 95 Tex. at 66-67, 65
S.W. at 31-32. Buie, however, expressly involved jurisdictional issues, while Stevens was
concerned only with a question of venue. The Ward case was based upon the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333
(1925).
The modern rule, in contrast, holds that service upon a local subsidiary is service upon the
foreign parent if the parent dominates and controls the subsidiary. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND), supra note 21, § 52, Comment b; Thomas, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 191, 198 (1972). The earlier cases generally can be distinguished because
no showing was made that the corporate entity of the subsidiary was disregarded or that the
parent dominated and controlled the subsidiary. When two companies are intertwined so
closely that they are for all practical purposes one functioning entity, service upon the one
within the state should be held to be service upon the other as well.





323. See South Tex. Dev. Co. v. Martwick, 328 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1959, writ refd n.r.e.).
324. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950); John-
son, Citation by Publication: A Sham Upon Due Process, 36 TEx. B.J. 205, 206 (1973).
1046 [Vol. 35
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION
gives notice to the defendant is an attenuated one when the defendant is
out of the country, and is particularly so in the case of a foreign national
who is not resident within the United States. Publicized service certainly is
not likely to come to his attention in time to answer and defend. For these
reasons, a court should be reluctant to allow its use unless every other
reasonable alternative has been tried and has failed.
While the last sentence of rule 109 appears to allow the plaintiff to am-
bush a defendant residing abroad,325 the American advocate first must de-
termine where the defendant's assets are located. Many foreign countries
will not recognize or enforce a foreign judgment based upon service by
publication. 326 If the judgment must be satisfied abroad, the advocate
would be prudent not to rely solely upon this type of notice. Moreover, if
the defendant's whereabouts abroad are known or can be obtained easily
by the use of due diligence, service by publication under rule 109 probably
violates due process requirements. 327
VII. SERVICE UPON FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
Following the adoption of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 (FSIA),328 state courts are unlikely to be hosts for suits against for-
eign governments; such a result is possible, however, because the FSIA did
not mandate exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts.329 Process upon a
foreign government or its political subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentali-
ties must be served in accordance with the terms of section 1608 of the
FSIA.330 Federal rule 4 applies to service upon foreign governments only
when service cannot be made by the procedures listed in the FSIA.331
Section 1608(a) of the FSIA provides a hierarchy of methods for serving
a foreign nation or one of its political subdivisions. If a special arrange-
ment for service exists between the parties, that means must be used. 332 If
no such arrangement exists, service must be made by the means provided
by any applicable international convention on service of judicial docu-
ments.333 If these methods are unavailable, service should be made by
325. The sentence reads:
[Wlhere the affidavit shows that the defendant is not within the United States,
and is not in the Armed Forces of the United States, it shall not be necessary
for the party to show that the residence or whereabouts of the defendant is
unknown or that an attempt has been made to procure service of nonresident
notice.
TEx. R. Civ. P. 109.
326. Brenscheidt, supra note 118, at 264-66.
327. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318-20 (1950).
328. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976).
329. Id § 1602.
330. Id § 1608.
331. See Republic Int'l Corp. v. Amco Eng'rs, Inc., 516 F.2d 161, 165 (9th Cir. 1975);
New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co., 495 F.
Supp. 73,79-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
332. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(1) (1976).
333. Id § 1608(a)(2).
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mail requiring a signed receipt.334 The clerk of the court is required to
mail a copy of the summons, complaint, and notice of suit, together with a
translation of each, to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs or the
head of state of the defendant.335 If service cannot be made directly by
mail within thirty days, another procedure is employed. The court clerk
must send by mail two copies of the summons, complaint, and notice of
suit, together with a translation, to the Director of Special Consular Serv-
ices of the United States Department of State in Washington.336 The sec-
retary is required to transmit one copy of the papers through diplomatic
channels and to return to the clerk a certified copy of the diplomatic note
showing when the papers were transmitted. 337
Service on an agency or instrumentality of a foreign country is similar to
service upon the government; the preferred method of service is that pro-
vided by any special arrangement that may exist between the parties. 338 If
none exists, service is made as provided by any applicable international
convention on the service of judicial documents or by delivery of the sum-
mons and complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent, or any
other agent authorized by appointment to receive process in the United
States. 339 If service cannot be made by one of these methods, it may be
accomplished: (1) by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint,
and a translation of each, in the manner directed by the foreign govern-
ment in response to a letter rogatory,340 (2) by mail to the foreign defend-
ant, requiring a signed receipt,341 or (3) as directed by the court.342
Service must be consistent with the law of the place where made343 and
must be reasonably calculated to give actual notice.3"
Service generally is deemed made upon the date of receipt by the de-
fendant as shown by the certification or postal receipt;345 when served
through diplomatic channels, service is deemed made on the date of trans-
mittal by the secretary.346 The defendant has sixty days in which to an-
swer the complaint. 347 The plaintiff must prove his claim to the court's
satisfaction, however, before a default judgment can be entered,348 even if
the defendant does not answer or appear.
Proper service under the FSIA will depend on whether the defendant is
classified as a foreign state, a political subdivision, or an agency or instru-
334. Id § 1608(a)(3).
335. Id
336. Id § 1608(a)(4).
337. Id
338. Id § 1608(b)(1).
339. Id § 1608(b)(2).
340. Id § 1608(b)(3)(A).
341. Id § 1608(b)(3)(B).
342. Id § 1608(b)(3)(C).
343. Id
344. Id § 1608(b)(3).
345. Id § 1608(c)(2).
346. Id § 1608(c)(1).
347. Id § 1608(d).
348. Id § 1608(e).
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mentality of a foreign state. The permanent mission of a foreign govern-
ment to the United Nations properly is characterized as a foreign state,
and is not a mere agency or instrumentality thereof.349 If the summons
and complaint and the required notice of the sUit35o are not translated into
the defendant's language, service is invalid. The plaintiff must comply
strictly with the statute's requirements in order to uphold service against a
later attack;35' in exceptional circumstances, however, courts have allowed
service upon foreign states and their agencies or instrumentalities under
rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, so long as the mode of
service chosen is not prohibited by the foreign nation's law.35 2 The FSIA
does not require the method of service to be a procedure prescribed by the
foreign government's law.353 Of course, the minimum contacts test must
be met before service of process under the FSIA will afford personal juris-
diction over the defendant under the due process clause.354
VIII. CONTESTING SERVICE OF PROCESS
A challenge to citation and service of process must be distinguished
from a contest of the court's jurisdiction. Although the court does not ob-
tain personal jurisdiction over a defendant unless he is served properly,
service does not guarantee jurisdiction. These challenges represent sepa-
rate attacks on the court's authority and should not be confused.
Contesting the formalities and technicalities of citation and service of
process in a Texas court generally is futile except for the purpose of vacat-
ing a default judgment. Even if the challenge to service is successful, rule
122 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if service is
quashed, the defendant shall be deemed to have been duly served and to
have entered an appearance within a certain number of days after the date
service was quashed.355 The penalty for failure to answer timely in re-
sponse to the constructive appearance rule is the entry of a default judg-
ment.356 If the service or citation is to be challenged, the attack is
accomplished properly by filing a motion to quash citation or service
349. Gray v. Permanent Mission of People's Repub. of the Congo to the United Nations,
443 F. Supp. 816, 819-20 (S.D.N.Y.), a fd, 580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978).
350. 40 D 6262 Realty Corp. v. United Arab Emirates Gov't, 447 F. Supp. 710, 711
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Gray v. Permanent Mission of People's Repub. of the Congo to the United
Nations, 443 F. Supp. 816, 821 (S.D.N.Y.), ajfd, 580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978).
351. Gray v. Permanent Mission of People's Repub. of the Congo to the United Nations,
443 F. Supp. 816, 821 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978).
352. New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co.,
495 F. Supp. 73, 78-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Exceptional circumstances might arise when diplo-
matic relations have been terminated and other means of communication between the na-
tions are sporadic.
353. Id
354. Thomas P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Producion de Costa Rica, 614
F.2d 1247, 1255 (9th Cir. 1980); Waukesha Engine Div., Dresser Am., Inc. v. Banco Na-
cional de Fomento Cooperativo, 485 F. Supp. 490, 492 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Carey v. National
Oil Corp., 453 F. Supp. 1097, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).




before an answer is filed. 357
The other way to attack service in Texas is more substantive; it involves
the question of whether a nonresident defendant is amenable to the in per-
sonam jurisdiction of a Texas court. Under rule 120a a nonresident de-
fendant may file a special appearance objecting to the jurisdiction of the
court over his person or property.358 The special appearance may be made
with respect to the entire proceeding or a severable claim, 359 and it must be
verified and filed prior to any other pleading or document by the defend-
ant.360 The defendant's attorney can make the affidavit in support of the
special appearance.361 Any other manner of challenging personal jurisdic-
tion will be deemed a general appearance. 362 The defendant can engage in
discovery proceedings fully without fear of waiving the special appear-
ance. 363 If the defendant's objection to the court's jurisdiction is overruled,
he may appear generally and defend without waiving his objection. 364
Under rule 120a the defendant has the burden to prove that he is not ame-
nable to the court's process.365 Thus, he bears not only the burden of pro-
duction but also the burden of persuasion. 366 While a defendant must
verify his special appearance in order properly to challenge the court's ju-
risdiction over him,367 an affidavit is inadmissible at the special appear-
ance hearing because it denies the opposing party the right to cross-
examine the witness.3 68 Normal rules of evidence apply at the hearing,
and proper evidence must be produced. The defendant is granted a privi-
lege against service of process while he is in the state for the purpose of
contesting jurisdiction under rule 120a.369 If the court grants the defend-
ant's motion contesting jurisdiction, it may order dismissal of the whole
proceeding or the severable part in contention.370
Federal practice has obliterated the distinction between general and spe-
cial appearances. 371 To challenge personal or in rem jurisdiction in fed-
eral court, the defendant either may file a motion to dismiss for want of
357. 2 R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE §§ 7.03, 9.05.1 (1970).
358. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a, § 1.
359. Id
360. Id
361. Omniplan, Inc. v. New Am. Dev. Corp., 523 S.W.2d 301, 304 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Waco 1975, no writ).
362. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a, § 1.
363. Id
364. Id § 3.
365. Smith v. Reynolds, 533 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no
writ).
366. Id; Hoppenfeld v. Crook, 498 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ
refd n.r.e.).
367. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a, § 1.
368. Main Bank & Trust v. Nye, 571 S.W.2d 222, 223-24 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978,
writ refd n.r.e.).
369. Oates v. Blackburn, 430 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1968, writ refd n.r.e.) (dictum); Thode, supra note 92, at 339.
370. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a, § 3.
371. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 271, § 1344, at 522.
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jurisdiction or may assert this defense in his answer.372 A challenge to the
citation or its service is made by filing a motion to quash or by asserting
the challenge in the defendant's answer.373 If these defenses are asserted
by way of a motion, the motion must be filed before the answer.374 Want
of jurisdiction over the person is waived unless presented promptly.375 A
motion to quash process or its service will be waived if any other motion is
filed prior to its being asserted.376 In response to a motion to quash pro-
cess or service, the plaintiff has the burden to establish the validity of the
process or service. 377 The plaintiff also has the burden to prove jurisdic-
tion over the person of the defendant when it is placed in issue.378 The
process server's return, when admitted into evidence, will establish a prima
facie case of service of process. 379 This evidence can be supported further
or can be rebutted at a hearing by affidavits, counter-affidavits, deposi-
tions, or live testimony.380 On a motion to challenge jurisdiction, affidavits
are admissible to support or rebut the challenge; the court also may allow
discovery on the jurisdictional issue.381 If a motion to quash process or
service is granted, the suit should be maintained rather than dismissed if a
reasonable prospect exists that the plaintiff will be able to serve the defend-
ant properly.382 When a motion to the jurisdiction of the court is sus-
tained, however, the suit usually will be dismissed.383
The courts' desire to uphold the method of service actually used by
plaintiffs in Convention countries, even when it does not comply with the
Convention, probably results from a belief that the suit will have to be
dismissed if service is not upheld and that the statute of limitations might
prevent its reinstitution. This rationale is in error. If a reasonable likeli-
hood of successful service exists, as usually will be the case when dealing
with a Convention country, the suit need not be dismissed at all; the action
can be maintained while the plaintiff re-serves the defendant under the
Convention. In Texas a challenge to the citation or service is deemed a
general appearance at a designated later time. 38 4 The case therefore is
never dismissed when the formalities of service are attacked. Even if the
suit is dismissed, however, most states have saving statutes, so the suit can
be reinstituted within a reasonable time without running afoul of the stat-
372. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2); see C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 271, § 1351, at
560, 563.
373. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4) & (5); see C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 27 1, § 1353,
at 577, 581.
374. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 271, § 1351, at 564, § 1353, at 580.
375. Id § 1351, at 564.
376. Id § 1353, at 581.
377. Id at 582.
378. Walker v. Newgent, 583 F.2d 163, 166 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 906
(1979); Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 489-90 (5th Cir. 1974); Navarro
v. Sedco, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 1355, 1357 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
379. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 271, § 1353, at 582.
380. Id at 583.
381. Id § 1351, at 565-66.
382. Id § 1354, at 584, 586.
383. Id § 1351, at 567.
384. See text accompanying note 355 supra.
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utes of limitations.38 5 The Texas saving statute is embodied in article
5539a.386 While it generally is considered to apply only to a dismissal for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 38 7 its language is broad enough to in-
clude a dismissal for want of personal jurisdiction because of improper
service.
IX. CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SERVICE ABROAD
In order to satisfy due process requirements, service of process must be
reasonably calculated to give the defendant actual notice of the proceed-
ings and an opportunity to be heard.388 At a minimum, due process re-
quires a summary of the documents (translated into the language of the
country in which they are served) to be delivered to the defendant along
with the documents. 389 The summary should show that a legal action of a
specific nature is pending against the defendant and should state the loca-
tion of the suit, the amount involved, the date by which defendant is re-
quired to respond, and the possible consequences of a failure to
respond.390 The summary may not be required, however, when the de-
fendant is shown to be sufficiently familiar with the language of the fo-
rum.391 The Texarkana court of civil appeals implicitly responded to this
constitutional imperative in Dosamantes v. Dosamantes,392 holding that an
attempted personal service on the defendant in Mexico was invalid be-
cause the delivery was attempted in English although the defendant spoke
only Spanish.
X. CONCLUSION
In order to alleviate the problems concerning international service of
process, the Texas Supreme Court should add to the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure a rule 108a, specifically authorizing service of process in foreign
countries. 393 The rule should provide that service in other countries is
385. See W. FERGUSON, THE STATUTES OF LIMITATION SAVING STATUTES 79 (1978).
386. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5539a (Vernon 1958).
387. W. FERGUSON, supra note 385, at 61.
388. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
389. Julen v. Larson, 25 Cal. App. 3d 325, 101 Cal. Rptr. 796, 798 (1972).
390. 101 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
391. Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 410 F. Supp. 4, 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Shoei Kako Co. v.
Superior Court, 33 Cal. A pp. 3d 808, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402, 412-13 (1973).
392. 500 S.W.2d 233, 237 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973, writ dism'd).
393. The proposed rule reads as follows:
RULE 108a. SERVICE OF PROCESS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES
(1) Manner. Service of process may be effected upon a party in a foreign
country if service of the citation and petition is made: (A) in the manner
prescribed by the law of the foreign country for service in that country in an
action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction; or (B) as directed by the
foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory or a letter of request; or
(C) in the manner provided by Rule 106; or (D) pursuant to the terms and
provisions of any applicable treaty or convention; or (E) by diplomatic or
consular officials when authorized by the U.S. Department of State; or (F) by
any other means directed by the court that is not prohibited by the law of the
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valid when made: (1) pursuant to the terms and provisions of any appli-
cable convention or treaty; (2) in accordance with one or more of the
methods provided by the internal law of the country where service is
made; (3) by letter rogatory or by letter of request; (4) by remise simple or
voluntary acceptance; (5) pursuant to the provisions of rule 106; (6) by
diplomatic or consular officials when so authorized by the United States
Department of State; or (7) by any other means directed by the court, so
long as it is not prohibited by the internal law of the country where service
is to be made. Additionally, the rule should require the method chosen to
be reasonably designed to give actual notice of the proceedings to the de-
fendant in time to answer and defend. It specifically should provide that
attempted service by other means is not a prerequisite to the use of any
form of service under the rule, and it should state that a defendant served
with process will be subject to the in personam or in rem jurisdiction of a
Texas court to the full extent allowed by the United States Constitution.
Rule 107 likewise should be amended to provide for proof of service
pursuant to a method provided by the internal law of a nation where the
service is executed or by a method provided in any applicable convention
or treaty. The last sentence of rule 109 also should be deleted. Federal
rule 4(i) should be amended to provide that both service and proof of serv-
ice can be made according to any method authorized in an applicable con-
vention or treaty. Finally, rule 55(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure should be amended to allow relief from a default judgment
taken against a resident in a foreign nation to be set aside pursuant to the
provisions of any applicable convention or treaty. Because the Convention
is the law of the land, it may not be necessary to amend Texas or federal
law to provide specifically for the procedures embodied therein; such
amendments, however, would focus the attention of courts and litigants on
the existence of conventions and treaties that might affect important rights.
Moreover, the express provision for these methods would resolve any un-
certainty that may exist as to the relationship between the Convention and
domestic law.
country where service is to be made. The method for service of process in a
foreign country must be reasonably calculated, under all of the circumstances,
to give actual notice of the proceedings to the defendant in time to answer and
defend. It is not a requirement for service of process by any one of these
means, including any of the means provided in Rule 106, that any other
method has been attempted previously. A defendant served with process
under this rule shall be required to appear and answer in the same manner
and time and under the same penalties as if he had been personally served
with citation within this state to the full extent that he may be required to
appear and answer under the Constitution of the United States or under any
applicable convention or treaty in an action either in rem or in personam.(2) Return. Proof of service may be made as prescribed by the law of the
foreign country, by order of the court, by Rule 107, or by a method provided
in any applicable treaty or convention.
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